


JPRS-UMA-94-014
20 April 1994



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-014

CONTENTS

20 April 1994

CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARMED FORCES

Revival of 'Military-Economic Societies' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Mar]	1
Expanded Collegium Session On Conscription [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Mar]	2
Corruption in Military Viewed [MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 31 Mar]	3
Low-Key Farewell to WGF Seen As Snub [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 14 Apr]	4

POLICY

Kolesnikov: CFE Treaty Amendments Needed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Apr]	5
---	---

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Specifications of Aviation Bombs [ISTOKI: RUSSKAYA VOYENNAYA GAZETA No 10, 1992]	8
An-124s for Rapid Deployment Forces [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 30 Mar]	8
Shortages, Shortcomings of Air Defense Troops [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 8 Apr]	9

NAVAL FORCES

Navy's Geopolitical Role Explored [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 26 Mar]	10
Safety Of Fuel Base: Pacific Fleet vs Vladivostok [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Mar]	12

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

News From Directorate of Engineering Troops [VOYENNY VESTNIK No 12, Dec]	13
--	----

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russia-Latvia Skrunda Agreement [DIYENA 23 Mar]	15
Russian Civil Defense Ministry Aid to Georgia [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Mar]	20
Admiral Kasatonov on Black Sea Fleet Problem [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 15 Apr]	20

UKRAINE

Problems in Coordinating Support for Air Force Units [NARODNA ARMIYA 15 Mar]	24
State of Ukraine's Aviation Industry [ROSSIYA No 11, 23-29 Mar]	26
Military Prosecutor on Crime in Army [HOLOS UKRAYINY 8 Apr]	28

CAUCASIAN STATES

Abkhazians Seize Strategic Point Of Lata [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Mar]	30
---	----

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Prospects for Defense Sales in Asia [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Mar]	31
Weapons Spares Deal With India Welcomed [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 Apr]	32

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Value of Civilian Products from Defense Industries

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No 47 (471), 17 Mar]

ARMED FORCES

Revival of 'Military-Economic Societies'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Martynenko, candidate of economics and chairman of the Military-Economic Society, and Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanyuk: "Traditions and Today: Military-Economic Societies: What We Can Expect From Them"]

[Text] It is no exaggeration to say that 1993 was a year of disappointment for servicemen in a material sense. And not because incomes did not grow as one would have liked and as had been promised, that military pay was held up for months, and many benefits provided by legislation were frozen. Something else became clear as well: Given the financial crisis, none of the declared priorities of supporting the Armed Forces are going to be met. The situation cannot be relieved by threatening orders from above, bold red inscriptions on financial and economic documents, or other administrative-command methods. As a result, beginning in the second quarter of last year, the Army and Navy began to suffer shortages of the most essential items—fuels and food. And those who entrusted the solution of their problems to all manner of funds created to provide social protection to servicemen were bitterly disappointed. The money had gone down the drain, as they say, and with it their faith in any nongovernmental initiatives in this area. The question must now be posed in the following terms: Will the Russian Armed Forces survive under market economy conditions or not?

The market system, as we know, has existed for more than a few decades. It would be strange to think that the world has not yet devised mechanisms to help servicemen adapt to its harsh terms and specific rules. One such mechanism is the creation of military-economic societies. Their prototype arose in Holland back in 1819. The Equipment Capital enabled officers to obtain equipment and supplies of the highest quality at modest prices.

Late in the last century, military-economic societies began being created in many of the world's countries—Germany, France, Japan, Portugal, Spain. In Russia, the charter of the first consumers union for St. Petersburg sailors, known as Thrift, was confirmed in 1880. The Economic Society of Guards Corps Officers arose in 1891 and was the largest up to that time. By 1915 such societies were functioning in the Kiev, Odessa, Kazan, and Moscow military districts and in many large garrisons. They provided their members with discounts on goods and services of up to eight percent off average prices. They did so by opening their own stores, warehouses, and repair shops and by concluding contracts with trading firms, book publishers and others companies under which society members received discounts and benefits. Some military-economic societies created

mutual aid associations that supported the families of those who had perished or died of war injuries.

The next stage in the development of the military-economic movement was the emergence of associations whose aim was to develop military sciences, equipment, and industry. The best known of them was an engineer officers group that was subsequently known as the Military Personnel Society and later the Military Science Enthusiasts Society.

All the societies consisted of subscribers (for one-year periods or for life). In some places officers had shareholder rights. One could also point out that in 1894 all men of the czar's family—14 people in all—were members of the Economic Society of Guards Corps Officers.

Members and life-long subscribers received dividends from profits based on the shares they owned and enjoyed a cash premium in proportion to purchases made in the society. The latter benefit was also enjoyed by one-year subscribers. Many societies had a very large cash turnover. For example, the Guards Economic Society increased its turnover from 10.5 million rubles to 1899 to 23 million rubles in 1908. Three-quarters of this money came from trade and cash and securities transactions.

How was initial capital acquired? From society members' shares and contributions, subscriber fees, loans and credits, profits from the societies' own activities, from interest earned on securities, deposits, and loans, and from voluntary contributions. It should be pointed out that considerable sums of money from centralized sources, as we would say today, were appropriated to support their activities. For example, the czar built several buildings, including the current Central Military Department Store, and donated them to the Moscow Military-Economic Society.

Other facts also attest to the attention the state devoted to these structures. For example, the fact that military-economic societies were created with the consent and agreement of the government. The charters of all societies were approved by the defense minister or by one of his deputies. The defense minister was to be notified whenever a society ceased operations, after which an appropriate order was issued in the district concerned.

And now it can be said that a revival of military-economic societies has finally begun in Russia. One such structure arose last year, thanks to the efforts of military and civilian economists, political scientists, and legal specialists; it was registered with the Russian Ministry of Justice on March 22 as the Military-Economic Society. This was followed by the creation of the Russian Economic Society of Reservists. The organizations' main goals and tasks have to do mainly with pooling the efforts of reserve servicemen and officers to protect their interests in the privatization process, improving their living conditions, promoting the country's economic recovery, and increasing the effectiveness of military reform and the conversion of military production. More

than 50 regional organizations have been created in the past three months, just recently by the Air Defense Forces reserve officers at Sergiyev Posad, and preparations are being made for a founding conference at the Plesetsk space facility.

Acquiring initial working capital is a serious problem for officer economic societies. For such large regional centers as Saratov-Conversion, which has an annual turnover of almost a billion rubles, that stage is already past. That society's members have found mutually advantageous forms of cooperation with local government agencies and with dozens of enterprises in neighboring oblasts, proposing modern technologies, deliveries on favorable terms, and interesting projects. Others are only just forming their operating capital. Membership dues, as a rule, range from the cost of a monthly food ration to 100,000 rubles. Some use monies from mutual aid funds. And officers at an aviation garrison in Tver Oblast contributed a million rubles each from the retirement benefits they received upon discharge.

What are the resulting benefits for servicemen, workers, office employees, and those who have already been discharged into the reserves? Society members can buy consumer goods and food products at prices just seven to 10 percent above enterprises' release prices, while prices are marked up 29 percent for those who have not bought shares. That is still cheaper than in military stores, which have to maintain sizable staffs, warehouses, and other facilities and which in some areas have set prices that are even higher than those in commercial stores. Military-economic societies that have direct ties with suppliers pay only for the labor of the reserve officers and family members of the servicemen directly involved in the work. The new structures are not in a position to supplant military trade at the current stage, but they can already stimulate healthy competition in providing trade services to garrisons.

The Russian Economic Society of Reservists already has land allocations in a number of parts of the country, has concluded agreements with leading construction and design organizations, and is prepared to start building apartments for reserve officers. Several multi-unit apartment buildings are now ready for tenants. The apartment prices will be 10 to 12 percent below the Defense Ministry's cost, and oversight will be more reliable, since the society members who lack apartments have an interest in this. The next move is up to the government, which has promised to appropriate sizable amounts of money to local administrations for this purpose; it will be important to ensure that the funds are not wasted the way they were last year.

Military-economic societies have also asked the government to eliminate the unequal situation of servicemen vis-a-vis labor collective members in voucher privatization. The gist of their proposals is that reserve servicemen and officers be allowed to buy surplus Defense Ministry property and real estate at 1991 prices and that reserve officer economic societies be allowed to operate

as (confidential) trusts or lease on favorable terms various repair enterprises, shops, and workshops, as well as to lease equipment and other materials.

The Russian Federation State Committee for Geology and the Use of Mineral Resources, in conjunction with the Military-Economic Society, is currently devising programs to reclaim lands vacated by the Armed Forces and to use them as farmland.

There is no question that many of these efforts could be slowed or blocked if military-economic societies fail to receive psychological and material support from the government and the Defense Ministry. One would like to believe that this won't happen, that the more than 150-year experience of similar organizations in many European countries will be taken into account (societies are currently operating successfully in Germany, Italy, Turkey, and other countries) and that the basis already established in our country will be revived in a new form. But this does not mean leaving people to deal with their problems on their own; we must simply foster conditions that will make it possible to use the enormous potential of servicemen, and above all reservists, in efforts to solve the most urgent social problems.

Expanded Collegium Session On Conscription

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Russian Defense Ministry Information and Press Administration: "Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Collegium Discusses Conscription Problems"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Pavel Grachev, held an expanded session of the Russian Defense Ministry Collegium on March 26 to discuss the results of the fall 1993 conscription of citizens for military service in the Armed Forces and measures to improve the work of military commissariats. The collegium session was attended by officials of the president's administration, the government, the Russian Procuracy, military district and fleet troop commanders, and military commissars from a number of Russian oblasts.

The session participants said that the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, military district commands and staffs, and military commissariats, in conjunction with chief administrators, had made strong efforts to support the fall 1993 conscription of citizens for military service and manpower acquisition for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Despite the measures taken, however, the military conscription target was not met completely. This was the result of a number of factors, including the continuing increase in the number of instances of evasion of military service.

In order to carry out the conscription of citizens for military service and manpower acquisition programs for the Armed Forces in 1994 in a well-organized fashion, collegium members adopted a decision to request the

Russian Federation government to accelerate the process of reviewing and confirming statutes on military registration, military conscription, and medical examinations for military conscripts and a schedule of rated military specializations. The Defense Ministry Collegium also resolved to make every effort to ensure the high-quality selection and recruitment of citizens for contract military service in accordance with established targets and to fill all warrant officer vacancies in the Army and Navy. The session participants called attention to the need to enlist as many representatives of labor collectives, educational institutions, and public organizations as possible in work with conscripts during the spring conscription campaign.

Corruption in Military Viewed

944F0556A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
in Russian 31 Mar 94 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Justice Grigoriy Nosov, first deputy chief of the Main Directorate for Supervision of Fulfillment of Laws in the Armed Forces, by Dmitriy Kholodov; place and date not given: "Military Mishmash: Lieutenant General of Justice Nosov: 'There Are Many Violations in the Higher Military Echelons Connected with Illegal Commercial Activity'"]

[Text] While independence may be detrimental to some, apparently, it is clearly beneficial to the Military Procuracy. It has been noted that the less the Main Directorate for Supervision of the Fulfillment of Laws in the Armed Forces (this is what the GVP [Main Military Procuracy] is now called) depends on these Armed Forces in a personnel and financial sense, the more efficient its activity becomes.

We asked Lieutenant General of Justice Grigoriy Nosov, first deputy chief of the main directorate, to talk about corruption and the nonfulfillment of laws and regulations in the Armed Forces:

[Kholodov] The GVP has been turned into a directorate of the General Procuracy with a long name that includes the phrase "supervision of the fulfillment of laws." It would be interesting to know how you do this, given the existing chaos in the legislative system of the country?

[Nosov] Our practical experience has shown that the problem of the fulfillment of laws, to put it mildly, has not been resolved. Military procurators have exposed more than 12,000 violations of legislation. On our protests, about 1,800 illegal orders and other acts of the command authorities were canceled. More than 13,000 officials were made financially liable. But the adoption of a package of military laws was a big step. Previously many aspects of military activity generally were regulated only by orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately, under existing laws, the procedure for their implementation has not been worked out in many ways. Up to the present time, the subordinate legal acts necessary for this have not been adopted. The situation is unprecedented for us as well: The Military

Procuracy is not mentioned at all in the Law on the Procuracy of the Russian Federation.

[Kholodov] You are outside the law?

[Nosov] We were previously locked into the Union Procuracy. Then the Russian Procuracy took us under its jurisdiction. There is only an outdated 1981 decree on military procurators, and we are compelled each year to confirm our existence with special normative acts of the president and parliament.

[Kholodov] Does the Military Procuracy frequently protest the orders of higher military officials?

[Nosov] We conduct supervision over the fulfillment of laws, including also by senior officials up to and including the minister of defense and his deputies. In 1993 we protested 27 orders of the minister and his deputies. In 1992 there were 19 such protests.

[Kholodov] What kind of laws are most frequently violated by this contingent of servicemen?

[Nosov] For example, the order on the promotion of Dmitriy Yakubovskiy to the rank of major of justice. The directive of the commanding general of the Internal Troops of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Russian Federation that prohibited the allocation of housing to unmarried officers and warrant officers. The instruction of a deputy of the Ministry of Defense that authorized the discharge of officers without granting housing was protested.

If we are talking in general about violations of laws in the higher echelons, there are enough of them. There are especially many in the assignment of housing. In the North Caucasus Military District, on the verbal instructions of General Netkachev, the commander of a large unit, apartments were given to his deputies out of turn—to Generals Kulakov and Artemov.

[Kholodov] Apartments, of course, are a very important issue for officers. But in the army cases of corruption are treated with extreme sensitivity, especially those among the senior command personnel. Are the military procurators conducting any kind of work in this direction?

[Nosov] Many violations in the upper echelons are associated with illegal commercial activity that is forbidden in the army. Just as a result of inspections in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense by forces of the main directorate, reimbursement was made for damages in the sum of about 16 billion rubles [R]. Ten criminal cases were instituted. In particular, under Article 260, clause a, of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, with respect to Colonel General of Aviation Pavlov, commander of Aviation of the Ground Troops, and Generals Lukashev and Vorobyev, who are subordinate to him, who committed abuses in the sale of military aviation equipment that resulted in a large financial loss to the state. In the interests of the investigation, I cannot say more. There are many cases of servicemen working in commercial structures, holding

staff positions, receiving money. This does not lead to anything good. The military are not businessmen but officials.

[Kholodov] We literally receive streams of complaints from officers here at MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET. Do servicemen turn to you?

[Nosov] There are many complaints. Last year about 12,000 of them came to the organs of the Procuracy. We check them out, and institute criminal cases in some of them. For example, a criminal case was instituted in January under Article 260, clause a, regarding Major General Baskayev (commander of the Internal Troops of the Moscow District). On Baskayev's instructions, Colonel Trofimov, commander of an Internal Troops subunit, concluded a contract with a certain commercial organization to guard with Internal Troops forces a building that was under construction. This company assumed the obligation of allocating dwelling space in this building to servicemen as payment for the guard duty. It turned out that this company was not the owner of the housing. As a result, housing was not allocated to them. Then servicemen of the Internal Troops blockaded the building. The apartments had already been distributed among civilians. With the employment of special means of the forces of the Internal Troops, the legal owners were evicted from the apartments and servicemen of the Internal Troops and other persons who were absolute outsiders were settled in them. In addition, damage was done to the property of citizens in a sum of more than R272 million, and to an enterprise associated with this building in a sum of R64 million. Proceedings were instituted on the charge of arbitrariness by the commanding general.

[Kholodov] Commercialization in the army is terrible in that arsenals are becoming empty. Are a lot of arms stolen in the Russian Armed Forces?

[Nosov] In recent years the number of thefts has increased by a factor of 25. While in 1987-1988 a little more than 100 units were stolen, now this is thousands of gunbarrels. All told last year military procurators investigated 317 cases concerning theft of arms and ammunition.

[Kholodov] Where is the most stealing?

[Nosov] In military units deployed in "hot spots." Most of all in the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus. On 25 April 1993 there, for example, 44 armored assault vehicles were stolen: About 60 armed militants [Mkhedrioni] broke into the territory of a military unit in Kutaisi. It is interesting that while previously the objects of theft were pistols and rifles, frequently for hunting, now it is grenades and machine guns. Last year two sailors of the Baltic Fleet stole a PZRK [portable SAM] Strela-2.

[Kholodov] Indispensable for hunting...

[Nosov] They were arrested while attempting to sell it for \$40,000. Since September of 1993 a private and a junior sergeant had removed six Igla SAM's from a depot and were selling them to Lithuanian citizens—this also occurred in the Baltic Fleet. In October 1993 in the Leningrad Military District, Warrant Officer Ismailov stole seven 23-millimeter rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns!

[Kholodov] And the last question. We have hardly talked about hazing of new conscripts for some time. There seems to be a reserve of trust in the current Ministry of Defense. Now, it seems, telephone calls and letters have literally burst forth... I would like to hear the statistics on such crimes that are available to the Military Procuracy.

[Nosov] You can see a reduction in crimes of this nature by 14.6 percent in comparison with 1992. During all 1993 for all troops, 1,287 hazing crimes were recorded. But this is "clean hazing," and its importance in the total number of military crimes is less than 5 percent.

[Kholodov] Is there "dirty hazing"?

[Nosov] That is to say, "clean hazing" implies nonregulation mutual relations among servicemen that are not in relations of subordination or seniority with respect to one another. The number of these crimes does not include, for example, assault and battery by commanders.

In the last year we concluded the investigation of 1,942 criminal cases of nonregulation mutual relations. About 80 percent of these were sent to court. [end Nosov]

It is difficult to oversee laws in a state where there are none, or where they contradict one another. Nevertheless, the Procuracy is obligated to be impartial. But whether the Procuracy is earning its keep is for you, taxpayers, to judge.

Low-Key Farewell to WGF Seen As Snub

PM1504095594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 14 Apr 94 p 3

[Sergey Ovsienko report: "'Quiet' Send-off for Russian Troops From Germany. Official Bonn Insists on It"]

[Text] Berlin—Soviet and Russian troops have been on German territory for almost half a century. Our last soldier will leave the now-united country 31 August this year, and a major military grouping that had once been abroad will return home.

Many Western politicians, particularly in the FRG, are calling this a historic event, linking it to the end of the "Cold War." And they are right. Units of what was then the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany took part in the Berlin events of 1953 and 1961, went into Prague in August 1968....

At the same time, the almost 50-year presence of this military grouping in central Europe has been a deterrent. The same politicians are right to link peace on the

European continent with the presence in Germany of the Western Group of Forces [WGF]....

Thus, a dignified withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany is a matter of prestige for our country which enhances still further its authority in Europe and the world (particularly following our diplomatic successes in Yugoslavia).

Speaking at a Berlin press conference at the end of last year, Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the WGF, made public the Russian proposals for the ceremonial send-off, which, as he put it, had been submitted to the Russian president. They included two stages—April-May (memorial to our fallen servicemen) and August (ceremonial assembly in Berlin of an honor guard made up of Russian and allied troops and the Bundeswehr, a march, a ceremonial Reichstag session with the participation of the two states' leaders, and a "roundtable" for World War II veterans)....

The commander-in-chief then advised that the German leadership had not reacted in any way to these proposals, which had previously been conveyed to the German side.

Last March I talked with Defense Minister Army General P. Grachev. Holding talks with his colleague (FRG Defense Minister V. Ruehe) he noted that the question of the send-off ceremony for the Russian troops comes under the jurisdiction of the two leaders—President Yeltsin and Chancellor Kohl.

Until recently official Bonn in its discussion of the Russian troop send-off had restricted itself to bland diplomatic formulas. The Berlin Senate was quite definite and did not indulge in any diplomatic equivocation in insisting on separate send-offs for the Russian and allied troops—from the United States, Britain, and France. Although the last WGF soldier will leave Germany "quietly" 31 August, the allies can expect a triumphant send-off in Berlin in early September.

The Berlin Senate's statement began to feature in the FRG newspapers, and was disseminated, with some confusion, by world news agencies....

An attempt was being made for the umpteenth time to put Russia in its place and silence it. And by whom—the Berlin Senate! Was it right to resolve on behalf of the federal government political problems that are of European and world rather than municipal importance?...

Unfortunately, the Russian Foreign Ministry, our Bonn Embassy, and its Berlin office failed to react at all to the Berlin Senate's move. As subsequent events were to show, this was wrong.

At a Bonn press conference in late March Chancellor Kohl voiced his version (now the official version) of the allied troops' send-off from Germany. It differs little from the Senate version. The French Foreign Ministry, by insisting on a parade, forced Bonn to abandon its intention to give the allied troops a modest send-off from Berlin.

Now the chancellor has promised our World War II allies a triumphant send-off ceremony with a military parade, banners, and music....

Explaining this sudden decision, H. Kohl stated that it was the logical conclusion to the stormy debates about the send-off to be given to the allied troops who had for 50 years guaranteed the preservation of the status of West Berlin....

What about the Russian troops? Bonn is insisting on a "quiet" send-off far from Berlin, at WGF Headquarters in Wunsdorf. Whereas the allied send-off will end, for instance, with a ceremony of mourning at the Brandenburg Gates, no such ceremony is envisaged for the Russian troops.

I would recall that in the Berlin Operation our forces lost over 300,000 men. And it would be blasphemous not to pay our respects to them one last time.

The German capital is going further in its division into worthy and less worthy. The allied ceremony on 8 September will be addressed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Francois Mitterrand, and by Prime Minister John Major. The Russian president and the federal chancellor will speak 31 August at the memorial to the Soviet troops in Treptow.

...Europe is no longer the way it was in the fifties and sixties, at the height of the "Cold War." There will be no return to a past which brought the peoples to the brink of a dangerous confrontation. History cannot be rewritten to suit short-term interests. People are in agreement on that in both East and West.

But, on the other hand, how can we understand the Bonn authorities' decision to have separate send-off ceremonies for the World War II allies, dividing them into worthy and unworthy, and essentially revising this same history?

POLICY

Kolesnikov: CFE Treaty Amendments Needed

PM1904133994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Apr 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of general staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: "Problems of Flanks and Future of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces"]

[Text] It will soon be two years since the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) entered into force, laying the foundation to real disarmament in Europe. The results of the first stage of the treaty's implementation attest graphically to the serious attitude of the Russian Federation and other signatory states to the fulfillment of the commitments they have undertaken. As of 15 April 1994 some 7,886 tanks, over 9,300 armored combat vehicles, and 3,458 artillery systems,

about 900 combat aircraft and 240 strike helicopters had been reduced in Europe. Of this quantity Russia had reduced 5,155 weapons and items of equipment (about one quarter).

All this confirms the treaty's vitality. At the same time new political and military-strategic realities which have now taken shape in Europe and the world demand a certain adaptation of its positions to the situation's present conditions.

Let us recall that the treaty was elaborated under the conditions of fierce antagonism between the two systems and their confrontation and the armed opposition of military blocs—the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is not surprising that it included provisions on the regional division and flank restrictions of weapons and equipment.

The main idea of the treaty with regard to regional division was to reduce the dangerous concentration of arms on the line where the groupings of the Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces were in contact, primarily in Central Europe, and also to restrict the quantity of arms in the region next to Central Europe, known as "expanded Central Europe." In accordance with this idea the regions' borders were determined. For the majority of countries they coincided with state borders. But for the USSR, considering the size of its territory and the contours of its regions, these borders were determined by the borders of the military districts.

As a whole, the principle of regional division enshrined in the treaty and providing for the "decanting" of weapons from the line of contact to deep positions (the so-called "lock gate" principle) under the conditions of confrontation between the two blocs justified itself. Similar aims were served by the establishment of strictly fixed and relatively low levels of weapons for the flank regions and also the restriction on depot stocks of arms here.

At the time for the Soviet Union—a single state with powerful armed forces—the limitation on flank forces determined by the CFE treaty was acceptable. It ensured the USSR the building of a reliable defense both in the North and in the South. But with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union the military-political situation in Europe changed drastically. Some of the treaty's provisions were correspondingly in need of certain amendments. Some of these amendments have been made. The territory of the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) was excluded from the treaty's region of operation. Russia, Belorussia [Belarus], Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia [Moldova], and Kazakhstan became the USSR's successors as signatories of the CFE Treaty. Overall, arms levels established for the Soviet Union and regional levels were shared among them. Here the flank water level was shared only between six successor-states (Belorussia and Kazakhstan are not in the flank region).

If at the time it was signed the treaty set a specific balance of regional forces, then with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the redistribution of its levels among the independent states that arose on its basis, this balance was violated. It was for that reason that the flank problem arose for Russia. Its thrust is as follows.

First, under the CFE Treaty the Soviet Union in the flank region including the Leningrad Military District, the North Caucasus Military District, the Transcaucasus Military District, and the Odessa Military District, had the right to deploy 1,850 tanks and 1,800 armored vehicles, and 2,776 artillery systems with a caliber of 100 mm and above. But after the distribution of the arms allowed in this region between the states which were the USSR's successors, Russia acquired the right to have in regular units on its flanks (the Leningrad Military District and the North Caucasus Military District) just 700 tanks, 580 armored vehicles, and 1,280 artillery systems. Considering that these two districts occupy over half Russia's European territory and considering their geopolitical importance, these levels are obviously inadequate for the Russian Armed forces for creating a defense grouping. Essentially conditions have arisen in which the troops in these districts must manage without the necessary quantity of heavy weapons. And I think there is no need to explain what an army is without modern weapons. It must also be considered that the levels authorized by the treaty include weapons and equipment not only of the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts but also of some naval components—the coastal defense and marine forces which perform specific functions. These restrictions also include tanks and armored combat vehicles at repair enterprises—and they come here from virtually the entire territory of Russia. Considering all this it is not hard to conclude that the personnel of our ground forces units deployed in the flank region could remain virtually without armored cover and defense.

Second, the redistribution of the commitments of the former USSR has entailed a fundamental change in the correlation of arms levels stemming from the treaty for Russia in the region of "expanded Central Europe" and in the "flank region." As a result, of the overall level for the Russian Federation (6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored combat vehicles, and 6,415 artillery systems), in the regular units on the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast (in all 15,000 square kilometers or less than 0.5 percent of the European part of Russia) six times more tanks and 15 times more armored combat vehicles can be deployed than in the entire flank region (Leningrad Military District and North Caucasus Military District taken together).

That means that the flank restrictions push Russia toward concentrating its conventional armed forces on the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast and along the borders with Belorussia and Ukraine. Essentially this leads to the restoration of the confrontation of Cold War times along

the West-East line, which runs counter to the treaty's aims and to Europe's desire to create a new security system.

The situation which is taking shape is strange, to put it mildly. The conservation of the flank restrictions structure determined by the treaty leads to a situation where some people can in the interests of national security deploy troops where they consider it necessary while others cannot. Here the discriminatory orientation of this provision is manifested only with regard to Russia and Ukraine. It is these two states which cannot deploy their armed forces on their national territory as they see fit. Thus the treaty's provisions on flank restrictions, which do not accord with present-day realities, essentially reinforce the position of Russia and Ukraine, which does not give them the same rights as other signatories. The real interests of these two states' security under present conditions are not considered.

For Russia the state of affairs is further aggravated by the fact that in the very near future the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Germany and also from the Baltic countries, the Dniester region, and other regions of the former USSR is to be completed. The tough framework of the flank restrictions compels us to withdraw the troops either to the territory of the Moscow Military District, where the troop level has reached the limit, or to the rear region—the Volga and Ural military districts, where the relevant infrastructure does not exist. And that when conditions are more suitable in Pskov, Novgorod, and Vologda Oblasts, for instance, which belong to the Leningrad Military District, and in the North Caucasus Military District.

Third, considering the geopolitical changes which have occurred in the post-Soviet area, the concept of flanks itself has also changed. This has affected most of all the southern part of Russia's flank region. Previously, before the treaty was signed, the North Caucasus Military District was seen in the USSR Armed Forces as a rear region. This was correspondingly reflected in the district's tasks, its structure, staffing, and the direction of its training. The situation has now changed drastically—the district has become a border one.

We must also consider the overall situation which has taken shape in this direction. The situation here remains exceptionally tense, which requires an adequate military presence from Russia. That is important not only from the viewpoint of ensuring internal security but also for the stabilization of the situation in Europe as a whole. Of course we rule out Russian military intervention in the internal affairs of the states of these regions but it is after all possible that Russian Armed Forces formations will be brought in to conduct operations to restore and maintain peace, naturally with a consideration for our domestic legislation and international law.

Fourth, the flank restrictions cause serious complications of an economic and social nature for Russia. As has already been noted, we are continuing the withdrawal of

troops from the territory of other states. These troops are deployed in regions where more favorable conditions exist. The erection of the necessary establishments for the troops in new, undeveloped places given the present state of the Russian economy is a task beyond our state's powers.

A special place here for all our other commitments is occupied by the social aspects of the problem. Behind all the figures and plans for structural changes and movements of troops in accordance with the military reform and the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty commitments there stand living people—officers and ensigns with their families and personnel on compulsory service. Concern for them is our duty and sacred obligation.

Thus the military, economic, and sociopolitical aspects of the problem connected with flank restrictions have acquired an exceptionally acute nature for Russia. They directly affect the interests of the state's security.

As we know, the right to choose one's own ways of ensuring security and guarantees of security is one inalienable element of state sovereignty. We can see clearly enough how this right looks for Russia in the context of the flank restrictions stemming from the CFE Treaty. It is perfectly obvious that with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR and the formation of new independent states on its territory these restrictions have lost their political and [passage illegible]. That is why the Russian Federation is so persistently raising the question of resolving the problem of flank restrictions in a way acceptable to all the treaty's signatories.

In September last year Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin sent the heads of state and government of a number of CFE Treaty signatory countries a special message clearly setting forth our position on the flanks problem. Following this the Russian delegation submitted in the Joint Consultative Group (created with a view to promoting the implementation of the CFE Treaty) the proposal to suspend the operation of the treaty's article concerning flank restrictions and to embark on a joint search of ways of resolving the problem. Other possible measures were also set forth.

The representatives of the majority of the treaty's signatory states express understanding for our concerns. But they are going no further than noting this and are continuing to insist that the treaty be kept unchanged. Their main argument is that the introduction of any amendment to the treaty will cause "a chain reaction" of amendments as a result of which it will allegedly cease to work.

In our view the treaty could be overturned not by an "avalanche" of amendments and amplifications but by the increasingly obvious contradiction between its individual provisions and the new situation. It is here that we see the real danger to the fate of the treaty. Unless steps are taken promptly to adapt it to modern conditions and the relevant amendments are made—

amendments dictated by the course of life itself—then the treaty [passage illegible]. Unfortunately, in response we hear only general arguments about the treaty's unshakable, balanced nature, and its importance for the aims of pan-European security. But for some reason no specific proposals are to be heard for resolving the problem which has arisen.

It is perfectly obvious that we cannot delay a decision until later. We need complete clarity right now to choose the optimum defense potential configuration for Russia and to prepare the relevant infrastructure for the provision of amenities for the troops. The progress of military reform and the rates of withdrawal of Russian troops to national territory and other very important aspects of the Russian Federation armed forces' activity and organizational development.

Russia remains a convinced support of the CFE Treaty and is conscientiously fulfilling all its commitments. Just as we are reducing conventional weapons and equipment so we shall reduce them until we reach the maximum levels set for Russia. Just as we accept inspections to monitor the treaty's fulfillment so in the future we shall promote the monitoring in full. At the same time we count on the mutual understanding of our partners in the treaty in the search for a solution to the flanks problem.

Here we are also firmly convinced that deploying troops on its own territory in accordance with the state's views of the tasks of defense and the safeguarding of its own security interests is the inalienable right of every sovereign state. It contradicts neither the terms of the treaty nor article 51 of the UN Charter.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Specifications of Aviation Bombs

94UM0360A Moscow ISTOKI: RUSSKAYA VOYENNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 1992 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Combat Might of Russia: Aviation Bombs"]

[Text]

KAB-500 KR	
Weight, kg	560
Explosive charge weight, kg	200
Length, mm	3050
Diameter of body, mm	400
Area of coverage, sq km	1500
Guidance system	Television

KAB-500 L	
Weight, kg	534
Explosive charge weight, kg	195
Length, mm	3050
Diameter of body, mm	400
Area of coverage, sq km	1500
Guidance system	Laser

BeTAB-500ShP	
Weight, kg	424
Length, mm	2805
Diameter of body, mm	325
Thickness of armor that can be penetrated, mm	550
Diameter of crater, m	4.5

RBK-500ShOAB-0.5	
Weight, kg	334
Length, mm	1500
Explosive charge	565 ShOAB-0.5 bombs
Diameter of area of coverage, m	300-400

RBK-250-275AO-1sch	
Weight, kg	273
Length, mm	2119
Diameter of body, mm	325
Explosive charge	150 AO-1sch bombs
Area of coverage, sq km	4800

An-124s for Rapid Deployment Forces

94UM0358A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Mar 94 p 8

[Article by Vladimir Kandryshev: "'Ruslans' for Grachev"]

[Text] During a recent visit to the Aviastar Aircraft Construction Plant in Ulyanovsk, admiring the An-124 Ruslan heavy air transports in the assembly shop, Minister of Defense P. Grachev asked the generals escorting him: "How many of these aircraft do we need?"

The generals did not think long: "100."

Of course, being used to the principle of "ask for more, they will give you less," the generals overstated the number.

Nevertheless, P. Grachev promised the Ulyanovsk aircraft builders to order a dozen Ruslans for the quick response forces. But for an enterprise that is experiencing difficulties today marketing the Ruslan, even such a comparatively small order would be a blessing.

In this regard, it is appropriate to recall that the An-124 aircraft was created specifically for quick-response operations of a global nature for timely airlifting of heavy armament. Incidentally, when the Ruslan was being developed and put into production, the Afghan campaign was in full swing, and D. Ustinov, the minister of defense at that time, is considered the "godfather" of this aircraft.

Only the events of recent years, the temporary refusal of the Ministry of Defense—the sole customer—to purchase An-124 aircraft made it possible to create the civilian Volga-Dnieper Air Transport Company, which operates aircraft with the largest carrying capacity and which gained world notoriety by transporting unique cargo on Ruslan aircraft.

Grachev's plan to order An-124 transport aircraft for quick response not only confirms the thoughts expressed by I. Serebryakov in the article "Russia's Military Doctrine" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No 8, 1994) but also expands them in that the Ministry of Defense, possibly, is going the way of creating quick response forces of unspecified, but apparently sizable, numerical strength.

As we know, the missions of quick response forces are basically punitive in nature, unlike deterrence forces.

But since use of quick response forces outside the CIS is fraught with a corresponding reaction by public opinion both within and outside Russia, as well as other consequences, it is natural to ask: Why are quick response forces being created that are equipped with heavy armament, for the airlift of which the Ministry of Defense plans to order the mighty Ruslans?

Shortages, Shortcomings of Air Defense Troops

94UM0353A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military columnist Sergey Doronin: "The Commander-in-Chief's Word of Honor"]

[Text] *I caught sight of the blip from the NATO Orion ASW aircraft on the air situation plot in the Kola Air Defense Zone command post at 0849 on 31 March. Keeping a distance of 50 km from our shore, it was completing a turn onto the reverse course, from Cape Svyatoy Nos to North Cape, so as to return in 30-40 minutes. The friends in the partnership for peace were working in the previous manner...*

Navy men dislike Orions. Crews of surface ships dislike them because they are impudent. Not only will they fly around the ship, but they also will not fail to roar over superstructures. Crews of strategic submarines departing on patrol duty dislike them because the sonobuoys scattered by an Orion will transmit the submarine's characteristic noises to the aircraft with almost one-hundred percent certainty. The noises later will be

loaded into the computer programs of controllable mine ordnance. In a threat period, such weapons are laid covertly off exits from bases. You can be sure they will operate only against you.

Several years ago such actions evoked a response. Air defense aviation alert forces would be sent up with one mission: Hammer reconnaissance by all possible methods but one—destruction.

One such alert mission almost ended in tragedy. An SU-27 which had hovered over an Orion fell into the propellers, but evidently it pleased God not to allow a great misfortune that day. Both our fighter and the foreign reconnaissance aircraft made it to their airfields. Well, I don't know about the Americans, but our ace later got it pretty good. He was saved from the anger of higher-ups only by one thing: What was then still a Soviet nuclear powered submarine slipped unnoticed into the Barents Sea in this commotion.

Today "force majeure" circumstances are evaluated somewhat differently—from the standpoint of the ability of combat teams to adequately analyze the behavior of the tracked target and forecast its ultimate goals.

Previous methods of "bolt-rattling"—stopping a flight or forcing a landing—have been rescinded. This probably is correct. The world has become largely different.

As a rule, yesterday's potential enemy is not behaving as energetically, although he is not letting up in reconnaissance activeness. Last year 179 Orion flights were registered in the Barents Sea, and there already have been 52 in three months of this year.

"So you see for yourself," said Lieutenant General Aleksey Marenkov, air defense corps commander, commenting on this fact, "that while politicians seem to be getting friendly, the military do not forget their purpose."

By the way, it is not just aircraft of contiguous states of Finland and Norway that operate actively near Russian borders. It turns out the Americans also have interests in the Russian North and are invariable participants of the various "air shows." Not a year goes by that the British and French do not drop in to train in detecting our subs from the air.

Pilots of private light-engine aircraft and helicopters also are no less trouble. The specialists with whom I had occasion to chat are far from categorizing all of them as followers of the not unknown Mathias Rust, but there are so many who deliberately get on the nerves of duty air defense weapon teams. Sometimes fighter-interceptors must be scrambled and additional airspace surveillance and tracking systems must be started up. All this means expenditures, and no small ones: Just one liter of aviation kerosene costs R280 today. And filling an aircraft takes much more than ten tonnes.

Meanwhile, fighter regiments have difficulty keeping fuel reserves at the 30-50 percent level. This is an average for the troops. In the first quarter the Kilpyavr air regiment near Murmansk was allocated only five percent of what was required.

The reason is not new—Ministry of Defense inability to pay. Aviation kerosene, solar oil and gasoline are obtained by hook or by crook. Colonel General of Aviation Viktor Prudnikov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Air Defense Troops, recently got all this in Omsk on his word of honor. They believed him (regretting it for the umpteenth time!) and gave him 26,000 tonnes on credit. Counting what came before, it will be necessary to pay R11 billion for everything.

It is the very same picture with spare parts, but old ties far from always help out. More and more often, suppliers are treated indifferently: When there is prepayment, we'll talk...

I will not begin to accuse the heads of such enterprises of a lack of patriotism, because I know how difficult it is for them as well—no money to develop production, nothing to pay workers. I ask only one thing: Do not nag those officers who turn to you for help. They themselves already have been serving on credit for a long time. Pay has been issued only for January in two air regiments which I had occasion to visit—near St. Petersburg and Murmansk. Air defense missilemen guarding Kola Peninsula installations—enterprises, the atomic electric power station at Polyarnyye Zori, Fleet garrisons and bases—are in a similar situation. The state's debt for the Severomorsk formation's pay is around R600 million, and it is three billion for the large strategic formation at Arkhangelsk...

What is service without pay? Chancing to be in Murmansk recently, a missile regiment commander was unable to buy a stick of boiled sausage, which his wife had asked for the day before as she handed him the last R5,000 note that had been hidden away.

"You understand, I was ashamed to ask the saleswoman to cut off a piece, but for no more than 5,000..."

"I understand you, Lieutenant Colonel. The situation is morally repulsive. But who would explain something else to me: How, with whose concession, and for how much are streams with abundant fish leased on the sly in Murmansk Oblast? Who are they, these stern businessmen (would that they were only ours!)? Armed with Winchesters and assault rifles, they permit themselves to threaten the corps commander: "We don't give a damn, General, that you have equipment here on Rybachiy, that it has to be removed from here by ship. Clear out of here with a whole skin; this section of the peninsula is private property..."

Just quite recently service in the Arctic was considered prestigious. One year for one and one-half, one and one-half times the pay, arctic increments—all this more than compensated for all sorts of inconveniences of life.

Today for the most part it is zealots who inhabit the "norths," those for whom money will not cloud the eyes. Because no one pays either pilots or their families for clearing a snow-blocked runway. That is how they serve, together with the airfield soldiers and with the regimental commander.

You won't go from here to the "continent" for a replacement very often. There are fewer and fewer who wish to move to the Arctic, inasmuch as, having settled down in a more or less civilized place, people do not wish to leave it for fully understandable reasons. And you can't send them off under armed escort.

And what is to be done with residents of former garrisons such as of that same Novaya Zemlya? They removed the formation, but some of the people just remained there; there is nowhere to move to. Who will take the housing inventory on his balance sheet? How can acceptable everyday conditions be created for them and how can they be provided with work? Ministry of Defense personnel suffice only for a little bit—to maintain the vital activity of a combat infrastructure mothballed for the time being. The idea was for the rest to have gone over to institutions of local government, but a government decision is needed for this.

And the people work. Each day the combat teams of SAM launch systems, radars and command posts and the pilots of air squadrons go on guard over Russia's air borders. To hell with the area's biorhythms and geographic and climatic features. Whether it be the South or Kamchatka, there is work, with a meaning that is simple and understandable—protect the Motherland. If not we, then just who will do it?

NAVAL FORCES

Navy's Geopolitical Role Explored

94UM0336A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Mar 94 p 4

[Article by Aleksey Basov: "Russia Needs a Navy—But What Kind?"]

[Text] Having devoted more than forty years to naval service, I had mixed feelings when I read the article "We Must Save the Navy" in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. On its pages the paper raised a most urgent question which touches on the long-term vital interests of Russia. Once again I was convinced of the terrible situation (let us call a spade a spade) in which our navy has existed for the last two or three years, that same navy which for the first time in history had ranked second in the world in terms of power. The peoples of friendly countries on all continents welcomed ships flying the white and blue flag, and enemies treated it with respect on all the waters of the World Ocean.

The Deputy Chairman of Goskorr boronprom [State Committee of the Defense Industry] of the Russian Federation G. Voronin, straightforwardly and with facts in hand, sketched the rapid fading of our fleet and its

dismal prospects. In five years the complement of the navy has been cut by 40 percent. For the second year not a single new ship has been started. The basing system has been destroyed, alert-duty service has been cut, the squadrons of the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean have returned to their own coastal waters, some ship-building centers have broken away, and the financing of fundamental and exploratory research has stopped. Deprived of its navy, the country will inevitably lose its great-power status.

This prospect is dismal and ruinous for the state. Still, some estimates demand clarification, some predictions require discussion.

First of all I want to note that one can speak of the navy only with allowance for the geopolitical factor. In contrast to island states, England, Japan and (in a sense) the U.S., which does not have the million-strong armies of neighboring states nearby, Russia must first protect itself from the possible invasion of ground troops. Nor is invasion from naval axes ruled out.

As many now assume, world nuclear war is not very likely. But nuclear weapons will remain weapons of deterrence and prevention of aggression for many years yet. It is no secret that before the start of *perestroika*, when no expense was spared on defense, the USSR put the emphasis in the nuclear triad on heavy ground-based missiles (ICBMs), which the U.S. most feared and which most met the geopolitical interests of our state. At that time it was easier and cheaper to form the Strategic Missile Troops than the Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces.

A change in the structure of strategic offensive arms to increase the naval component up to 50 to 70 percent, as G. Voronin proposes, will lead to another naval arms race. Voronin acknowledges that it would be unrealistic and inexpedient to try to achieve quantitative parity at sea given the great economic superiority of the U.S. Our country would not be able to breathe freely under the burden of excessive military expenditures. He suggests concentrating strategic missile submarines and their supporting forces in the North and East as part of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Allowing for the great economic importance of the Northern and Far-Eastern Seas, the author believes that "our navy must provide full superiority in these zones." Accomplishment of this task would require too many forces. However, temporary control over certain waters with the goal of blocking amphibious assaults, for example, is a realistic task. The new grouping of Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces also demands balance by conventional forces, to prevent skewing in the direction of any single weapons system. Forces to combat submarines, aircraft carriers, and other strike vessels are needed. All this requires an "air-defense umbrella."

Everyone remembers the Caribbean crisis of October 1962, when our forces in Cuba found themselves beyond the reach of Soviet conventional weapons and we were

compelled to withdraw our missiles from Cuba literally under the muzzles of American guns. Thus in every theater, a complete structure of the present-day navy must be established.

So we must save the navy. To do this, the main forces of the navy must be concentrated in the North and Far East. What then of Russian interests in the Baltic and Black Seas? The U.S. has already announced that the Baltic countries and Ukraine are zones of their vital interests, and consequently they are prepared to defend them by force of arms. On March 19 of this year, on the "Vesti" (news) television show the new U.S. Defense Secretary W. Perry, allowing for the instability in Russia, spoke in favor of further development of nuclear forces, including the "Trident-2" sea-launched strategic missiles. Interest in the Baltic and Black Seas has also increased in other states.

Remember, however, that the appearance of a regular navy in Russia was prompted by an historical task, to penetrate the community of European states. Peter the First, after building St. Petersburg and creating the navy, had formed a great European power. Since then Russian has not been a guest in Europe, but an equal partner. Cooperation with European countries supported commercial and other interests in the Mediterranean. With the help of the navy dispatched from the Baltic, the Far East, Alaska, and Russian America were conquered. For Russia, remaining in the community of European states means having an army to protect it from possible invasion from the West and having freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea. The latter must come from the small but combat-ready forces of the Baltic Fleet. Here one must remember that during the Great Patriotic War, in the Northwest Strategic Axis the goals of the war were achieved through the joint efforts of the fronts, the navy, long-range aviation, and the National Air Defense Forces.

Russia's second geopolitical task has been and remains the furtherance of free trade of states at the crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. The annexation of the Crimea and the creation of the Black Sea Fleet met the needs of rapid development of the southern regions of the state. Rivalry with Turkey, England and France in this region led to wars, the demise of the fleet and its new restoration. Now the Near East is an enormous storehouse of oil. It is also a tangle of ethnic, religious and cultural contradictions, as was demonstrated by the Arab-Israel wars and the punitive operations against Iraq ("Desert Storm"), effected from naval and ground axes.

For Russia, remaining a Black Sea power is an historical, unending task. How can it be achieved without reliance on the base system in the Crimea, after losing the ship-building capacity in the south of the former USSR? Clearly we must continue to look for new forms of cooperation with Ukraine and the other Black Sea states.

It has developed historically that in Russian foreign policy, Far-Eastern and Pacific problems derived from European-Atlantic problems. The flood of international capital into Southeast Asia, and in particular to China, led Russia to create the Pacific Fleet, and resulted in two wars with Japan. Now in this region the task clearly is not to "ensure full superiority" but to maintain a reasonable balance of forces between the U.S., Japan, China and Russia. According to reports from the SMI [not further expanded], all ship-building plants have stopped running in the Far East, and without them there can be neither military bases nor a fleet.

At present public opinion supports the idea of a need to create more mobile and better armed forces. In this we cannot help but allow for past experience. In the 20th century, Russia (the USSR) participated in two world wars without having concluded the formation of an ocean-going fleet. This made the "Russian front" very dependent on the status of the battle in the European-Atlantic and Asiatic-Pacific theaters of war. Retention of naval might exerted a great influence on the results of wars. In the period of the postwar confrontation and the "Cold War," the USSR constructed a powerful ocean-going fleet, but excessive military expenditures, including those for the fleet, were one of the causes of profound economic crisis.

We should support in every way the proposal of Genadiy Voronin regarding the need to discuss the question of the navy before adopting a 10-to-15-year ship-building program and assigning the appropriations, not only in the Security Council but also in the Parliament. We need a Law on the Navy. The situation of the navy is so serious that perhaps its rescue should be started with the formation of an independent Ministry of the Navy.

Safety Of Fuel Base: Pacific Fleet vs Vladivostok

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Litkovets: "Environment and the Navy: Zolotoy Rog, Bay of Concern"]

[Text] A feud between the Vladivostok city government and the Pacific Fleet over the fuel base on the shore of Zolotoy Rog Bay has now gone on for more than 15 years. The city "doesn't like" its harmful effect on the environment. But without the only fuel base capable of fueling all classes of ships, the fleet will be half-paralyzed.

The storage tanks and production equipment of the Pacific Fleet's fuel storage facilities and bases recently marked their 50th anniversary. Given their total lack of bilge and ballast water treatment stations, their effect on the environment is limited only by the service personnel's enthusiasm. Meanwhile, taking each tonne of oil-contaminated water to the civilian sailors' treatment facilities costs the fleet roughly 10,000 rubles. This situation stems from the fact that financing for the

construction of treatment facilities in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy has been frozen at the level of two constructed tanks and the foundation for a boiler. And the Primorskiy Kray Environmental Protection Committee has banned the construction of a station in the vicinity of Vladivostok altogether. The committee's specialists maintain that the treatment facilities will be an additional source of pollution! But while demanding that the navy not pollute the environment, those same specialists have not impeded the operation of a seaport barge and ballast water treatment station located next to the ill-fated Pacific Fleet fuel base or the construction of additional treatment units at a civilian fuel storage facility in the commercial seaport. Nor are Pacific Fleet ships capable of "making their way through" to those stations: The fishermen and civilian sailors already have more than enough ships of their own, and foreign ship owners pay hard currency to have their wastes treated. And yet the Navy is accused of being the sea's most active polluter.

Yes, some of the criticism of the Navy is justified. Its ships, with the exception of a few recently built ones, lack effective systems to treat bilge. Equipped only with tanks for fecal and waste water, they are forced to discharge it into the sea since the Fleet lacks treatment facilities of its own. But fewer than 15 percent of the ships and vessels based here belong to the Navy, and an even smaller percentage in terms of tonnage. If one takes into account the fact that, in addition to the sailors, 23 sewage pipes and all the city's industrial enterprises dump their waste water into the Zolotoy Rog bay without any treatment whatsoever, it becomes clear that the fleet is by no means the main "wrecker" of the environment.

But when our future and the future of our children are at stake, determining who has caused the most harm to that future is not the main concern. A glance at a map showing the extent to which areas of the sea around Vladivostok are contaminated with heavy metals is truly shocking: The maximum allowable concentrations have been exceeded many times over, in some instances by several orders of magnitude. And so we need to discuss not just how to stop the practice of discharging untreated wastes, but also how to clean up wastes that are already "rotting." Can this be done?

The Pacific Fleet, for example, has just 15 oil-spill cleanup ships, four of which are in Vladivostok, but only two are operable. And only one of them—the MUS-342—is designed to skim petroleum product films from water surfaces. The others operate roughly like this: A man in an oil-stained padded jacket uses a pitchfork to scoop the waste from the water and toss it onto the deck. So the battle against environmental pollution at the current stage is for the most part haphazard.

"We proposed the establishment of a municipal office to clean waste and bilge from the water surface back in 1989," said Captain First Rank Aleksandr Nazarenko, chief of the Pacific Fleet environmental protection inspectorate. "After all, there are city services that collect household garbage, and something similar is needed on the water. But it turns out that nobody wants to take

responsibility for the water, so there still isn't anyone in charge of protecting it from pollution caused by human economic activity."

Late last year a decision was adopted to assign a number of bays around Vladivostok to the city. And so now is the time to think about setting up a municipal enterprise to clean up those waters. And under these circumstances, in Aleksandr Nazarenko's opinion, the Fleet should move as quickly as possible to carry out an environmental field documentation of coastal military installations, use it as the basis for devising an environmental monitoring program, and make that program part of an integrated and centralized environmental protection system that would operate in conjunction with civilian agencies. A Pacific Fleet ecological inspection service should be initiated by pooling at least the available waste-cleanup ships and equipment under a single command (they are currently assigned to the auxiliary fleet), completing the construction of the bilge water treatment stations, and cooperating with the kray environmental protection committee. These environmental protection measures will hardly result in an immediate return that can be measured in rubles or other currency. Another kind of return is more important—an averted ecological disaster that has been planted like a mine under our future.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

News From Directorate of Engineering Troops

94UM03394 Moscow VOYENNOY VESTNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 1993 pp 31-32

[Article by Colonel A. Nizhalovskiy, candidate of historical sciences and docent, under the rubric "From the Directorate of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense": "An Assembly of Administrative Personnel of the Engineering Troops"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for training the Russian Federation's armed forces a special operational assembly was conducted at the end of August 1993 under the supervision of Colonel-General V. Kuznetsov. This was the first such assembly on this level in the Russian Army.

More than two years had gone by since the last assembly, that one was in the Soviet Armed Forces. During that time a considerable portion of the engineering troops transferred to the armies of the independent states, former republics of the USSR, to industrial enterprises and design offices.

Russia's engineering troops have now taken shape, and the administrative personnel have been 40-percent renewed. There have been large changes also in the nature, the scope and the organization of engineer support missions. There are new weapon models and ammunition, and the conditions surrounding their safekeeping and operation have become more complicated. That is,

there have been fundamental changes in the conditions for the functioning of the engineering troops and in views on their combat employment and path of development.

The first day of activity was devoted to theoretical issues. In his report Col-Gen Kuznetsov summed up the results of the first stage of the development of Russia's engineering troops and told about prospects for their development and the main missions which must be accomplished in the immediate future. He also touched upon problems arising as a result of the altered geopolitical circumstances, the collapse of the USSR and the transition to market conditions. These were further developed in reports and speeches by deputy chiefs of engineering troops of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, the chiefs of leading departments at the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev and a representative of the General Staff Military Academy.

The assembly participants were particularly concerned about the fact that the scope of engineer support missions is tending to grow. The periods allowed for their execution is being reduced or remains the same, but the size of these forces is dropping considerably in the situation of reform of the Russian Army. This is reflected primarily in the fortification equipment of lines and positions, the establishment of engineer obstacles and the performance of operational and tactical camouflage measures.

It is obvious in this situation that it would be expedient to revise the deadlines involved and the extent of the fortifications, making protection of the personnel against weapons the keystone. In setting up the system of engineer obstacles we need to switch decisively from the mining of areas to the mining of specific facilities, the laying of most mixed minefields in the course of combat operations, on revealed sectors of enemy operations. Success in the execution of engineer measures will depend to a large extent upon the use of the latest facilities and the improvement of camouflage measures, and the enlistment not just of engineering subunits but also, and primarily, subunits of the troop army and branches of the armed forces for the performance of these missions.

Considerable problems are arising in the course of establishing new groupings of engineer troops. The withdrawal of a large number of formations and units of troops and their settlement within Russia, with a simultaneous reduction in numerical strength and the lack of vacant military posts, particularly housing, are making it impossible to set up groupings of engineer troops in the classical sense. This requires a great deal of effort not just of the command element of the engineer troops but also the commanders of the military districts.

Assembly participants considered such urgent problems as moral and psychological support for the operations of the engineer troops and indoctrination of the personnel at the modern level of their functioning.

Recently, given the withdrawal of troops and the large-scale removal of ammunition from the groups of forces, we are faced with a drastic exacerbation of the crime situation in the nation, with the problem of safeguarding the weapons and ammunition moving to the fore. The latter was the subject of discussion on the second day of the assembly. Classes were held at one of the arsenals of the engineer troops. Specific recommendations were worked out for safeguarding special ammunition in the districts and armies, and ways to solve the problems were outlined.

The third day was equally repleted and useful. For six hours the participants were acquainted with new models of engineering equipment and ammunition, prospective directions for the development of engineer weapons were discussed, and experience in their employment in various areas of the nation and at hot spots was exchanged. The assembly participants learned with great interest about the extent and the organization of engineering missions and the specific features of engineer installations on the Tajik-Afghan border. After all, matters of fortifying the border sectors, covering the sectors with the greatest mine danger and provisioning the troops with water following the tragic July events at the 12th Border Post have moved to the forefront.

A class on means and methods of operational and tactical camouflage was equally interesting and instructive. It was set up at the training center of the Military

Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev. The entire complex of means of camouflage and simulation—from the simplest of fire arms to a missile complex—was graphically represented there. The assembly participants were further convinced of the multilevel nature and complexity of camouflage measures.

Unquestionably the new models of engineer equipment, the new engineering ammunition and the prospective means of camouflage are all making it possible to raise the techniques and the organization of engineer support missions to a higher qualitative level. Due to difficulties with financing, however, the production of many new models not inferior to their Western counterparts in efficiency and originality of technical solutions is becoming a big problem.

At the conclusion of the assembly the chief of engineering troops of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense summed up the results and set missions for all areas of activity of the engineer troops, taking into account existing economic, social and financial circumstances. The objectives set for the assembly were met in their entirety. Its participants were not only enriched with new knowledge but also took with them into the forces numerous reference books and aids, and recommendations for carrying out the missions in the new circumstances.

COPYRIGHT: VOYENNNY VESTNIK No 12 1993

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russia-Latvia Skrunda Agreement

944K1061A Riga DIYENA in Russian

23 Mar 94 pp 9-10

[Draft of 15 March 1994: "Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radar Station During the Period of Its Temporary Functioning and Dismantling"]

[Text] The Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed to the following:

Article 1

The present Agreement shall be an inseparable part of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on the conditions, deadlines, and procedure for complete withdrawal from the territory of the Latvian Republic of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their legal position during the period of withdrawal from "_____ " 1994.

Article 2

1. The Skrunda Radar Station, hereinafter referred to as the Facility, is a Russian military institution under civilian control. Nothing in the present Agreement shall be regarded as giving this Facility the status of a military base.
2. The Facility includes structures, equipment, and individual components listed in Appendix No. 1 to the present Agreement.
3. During the period of its temporary functioning the Facility shall provide for radar observation of space.
4. Additional installation or replacement of equipment and components or construction work, as a result of which the Facility is modernized or its functions or technical specifications are changed, shall not be allowed.
5. During the period of temporary functioning of the Facility the Latvian Party shall retain the Facility's radio communications frequencies and also communications channels which it uses as of the moment of the signing of the present Agreement. The Parties shall be obligated not to allow interference in the operation of the Facility and communications network or radio broadcasting and television of the Latvian Republic. In the event of the appearance of interference, the Parties shall take immediate measures to eliminate it.

Article 3

1. The Latvian Party shall turn over to the Russian Party for temporary use a plot of land with an area of 164.5 hectares designated on the topographical map

which is an inalienable part of the present Agreement (Appendix No. 2) on which the Facility is located.

2. The Russian Party shall pay rent for the land granted for temporary use in the amount of U.S. dollars per year.
3. The sum indicated in point 2 of the present Article shall be transferred in two payments each half year: before 30 June—50 percent of the annual sum, before 31 December—the remainder of the annual sum. In the event of default of payments the Russian side shall pay a penalty in the amount of 0.05 percent for each day of default.
4. Any construction work on the territory of the Facility shall be allowed only during the period of its functioning after acquiring permission from the Latvian Party in keeping with the provisions of the present Agreement. This work may be done by the service personnel of the Facility or outside construction organizations of the Latvian Republic.

Article 4

1. Neither of the Parties shall use state symbols on the outside of the Facility.
2. All inscriptions outside the Facility must be in the Latvian language.
3. All inscriptions on the territory of the Facility shall be in the Latvian, Russian, and English languages.

Article 5

1. The Russian Party shall appoint its authorized representative (hereinafter—Manager of the Facility) and also individuals to act as manager if for any reason he cannot perform his duties himself.
2. The Manager of the Facility shall provide for management of the Facility and supervision of its activity, be responsible for the safety of the Facility, and regularly, no less frequently than once a month, report on work on the Facility and the execution of the present Agreement by the Combined Commission envisioned by Article 14 of the present Agreement.
3. The Latvian Party shall appoint its authorized representative (hereinafter—Representative of Latvia) and also individuals to perform his duties if for any reason he cannot perform them himself. The Representative of Latvia shall provide for external protection of the Facility, enforce the execution of the present Agreement and work on the Facility, and also, regularly, no less frequently than once a month, report to the Combined Commission.

4. The Manager of the Facility and the Representative of Latvia shall cooperate in solving problems related to the execution of the present Agreement.

5. At the request of the Manager of the Facility or the Representative of Latvia, any question may be submitted for consideration at the regular meeting of the Combined Commission. If one of the Parties thinks that the question requires an immediate solution at the level of the Combined Commission, it can demand that it convene an extraordinary session. In this case the session shall be conducted within three days of the receipt of the request.
6. The Representative of Latvia may visit the Facility at any time, informing the Manager of the Facility of this ahead of time.

Article 6

The number of personnel directly employed in the functioning of the Facility shall not exceed 599 military specialists and 199 civilian employees. Moreover, the Russian Party during the period of temporary functioning and dismantling of the Facility shall strive to reduce the number of military specialists by replacing them with civilian employees. Personnel who are citizens of the Latvian Republic and individuals residing permanently on its territory with the appropriate qualifications may be hired as civilian employees.

The indicated number does not include guards for the Facility or members of families of personnel, residents, and citizens of the Latvian Republic hired by the Manager of the Facility on the basis of labor agreements to work in the social sphere (trade, municipal services, medical and sociocultural services, preschool and school institutions).

Article 7

1. The Latvian Party at the request of the Russian Party shall issue temporary residency permits and other necessary documents required in connection with the arrival, departure, customs formalities, and residence in the Latvian Republic of citizens of the Russian Federation who are providing services for the Facility and members of their families. The general conditions for permits for the Latvian Republic in effect as of the time of the signing of the present Agreement shall apply to Russian personnel sent to work at the Facility. Individuals with work passports shall receive permits free of charge.
2. The issues mentioned in point 1 of the present Article shall be resolved through diplomatic channels. The corresponding documents shall be requested promptly—as a rule, 20 days in advance.

Article 8

1. Personnel employed at the Facility shall be under the jurisdiction of the Latvian Republic with the exception of those specified by points 2 and 4 of the present Article.

2. Labor relations among citizens of the Russian Federation employed at the Facility, including the examination of labor disputes, shall be regulated by legislative acts of the Russian Federation.
3. On the territory of the Latvian Republic criminal and civil cases and also cases of administrative violations involving individuals who are personnel at the Facility and members of their families, taking into account the provisions of points 2 and 4 of the present Article, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Latvian Republic.

Individuals who are personnel of the Facility and are citizens of the Russian Federation and also members of their families who are citizens of the Russian Federation shall enjoy in institutions of the Latvian Republic the same procedural rights and responsibilities as citizens of the Latvian Republic.

4. The Russian Federation shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to individuals who are personnel at the Facility and are citizens of the Russian Federation and members of their families who are citizens of the Russian Federation in keeping with legislation of the Russian Federation in the following cases:
 - a) if they commit crimes or administrative legal violations against the Russian Federation and also against individuals who are personnel of the Facility and are citizens of the Russian Federation and also members of their families who are citizens of the Russian Federation;
 - b) if individuals who are personnel of the Facility and are citizens of the Russian Federation commit crimes and administrative legal violations during the performance of their official duties.

Authorized organs of the Russian Federation and authorized organs of the Latvian Republic may request of one another transfer or acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to individual cases specified by the present Article.

5. In cases where individuals who are not personnel of the Facility, are not citizens of the Russian Federation, and are not members of families of individuals who are personnel of the Facility, and have citizenship of the Russian Federation, commit crimes or administrative legal violations against the facility and also against individuals who are personnel of the facility and members of their families, the guilty parties shall bear responsibility according to legislation of the Latvian Republic.

Article 9

1. Individuals who work at the Facility and members of their families, in keeping with legislation of the Latvian SSR, shall own, use, and dispose of mobile and immobile property legally belonging to them with rights of ownership, and in particular they may:
 - sell or in another way transfer the right of ownership to the immobile property belonging to them to relatives, citizens, or other residents residing in the Latvian Republic;
 - move, sell, or in other ways dispose of mobile property belonging to them with the right of ownership;
 - move or transfer their monetary funds from the Latvian Republic to the Russian Federation.
2. Individuals employed at the Facility and members of their families shall take advantage of the services of public health and postal and banking institutions of the Latvian Republic under general conditions.
3. A secondary school for teaching children of individuals working at the Facility may function on the territory of the Facility.

Article 10

1. The Russian Party shall have the right, observing the requirements of point 4 of Article 2 of the present Agreement, to bring into the territory of the Latvian Republic equipment and materials necessary for work at the Facility.
2. The freight mentioned in point 1 of the present Article shall not be subject to customs duties and fees, with the exception of payment for specific services. The freight shall be subject to customs inspection. The shipper of the freight or the individual accompanying it shall have the right to demand the presence during customs inspection of the Manager of the Facility or his representative. Freight to which access is prohibited out of considerations of secrecy shall not be subject to customs inspection if accompanied by documents indicating the secret nature of the freight. In exceptional cases when there are sufficient grounds, such freight may be inspected with a substantiated request from the customs organs of the Latvian Republic in the presence of a representative of the Facility.
3. The rules specified by points 1 and 2 of the present Article shall be applied only if the Manager of the Facility, no less than three days before the shipment of the freight to the territory of the Latvian Republic, notifies the Representative of Latvia of this in writing, communicating information about the cargo, its use at the Facility, and also the border crossing location.
4. Service personnel and members of their families who are citizens of the Russian Federation, after obtaining the documents indicated in Article 7 of the present Agreement, may ship personal effects and household

goods into the Latvian Republic or out of its territory without paying customs duties or fees, except for payment for specific services. With respect to the movement of other items, the procedure is determined by normative acts of the Latvian Republic shall apply.

5. Freight shipped from the territory of the Facility outside the territory of the Latvian Republic shall not be subject to customs duties or fees except payment for specific services. Freight shall be subject to customs control according to point 2 of the present Article.
6. Courier and postal communications and transportation of work-related documents and postal dispatches shall be organized by the Manager of the Facility according to a procedure agreed upon with authorized organs of the Latvian Republic.
7. Means of transportation belonging to the Facility shall be registered in the Latvian Republic. Special means of transportation shall be allowed to be brought in only with permission from the Latvian Party.

Article 11

1. During the period of temporary functioning and dismantling of the Facility the Russian Party and the Manager of the Facility shall provide for observance of the requirements of normative acts of the Latvian Republic for protection of the environment.
2. Upon completion of the dismantling work envisioned by the present Agreement, an expert ecological appraisal of the territory of the Facility and its environs shall be conducted with the involvement of international specialists on the initiative of one of the Parties. All costs related to the expert appraisal shall be borne by the Party that initiates it.
3. In the event that during the period of temporary functioning and dismantling of the Facility people, animals, or plants are infected with dangerous diseases which could spread beyond the territory of the Facility, the Manager of the Facility shall immediately inform the Representative of Latvia of this and take the necessary measures to prevent further spreading of the disease.
4. With the participation of international specialists, on the initiative of one of the Parties, there may be an expert appraisal of the impact of the activity of the Facility on the environment. All costs involved in this expert appraisal shall be borne by the Party that initiates it.
5. If it is established that the activity of the Facility causes harm to the environment or the population, or the ecological expert appraisal deems that such harm has been caused, the Russian Party must make reimbursement for this harm and also take measures to eliminate its causes.
6. The Russian Party shall take measures to minimize the inconvenience caused to the local population because of the activity of the Facility.

Article 12

1. External guarding of the Facility shall be provided by personnel appointed by the Latvian Party and be under the jurisdiction of the Representative of Latvia. The external guard shall not impede the transfer of freight onto the territory of the Facility, the removal of freight from the territory of the Facility, or the movement of personnel and members of families of personnel.
2. The internal guarding of the Facility shall be provided by the Russian Party in keeping with existing normative acts of the Russian Federation. The number of military specialists functioning in the internal guard of the Facility may not exceed 89. In order to perform their functions the internal guard on the territory of the Facility shall have the right to bear light weapons. Information about the quantity and serial numbers of these weapons shall be submitted to the Representative of Latvia.
3. Access and entry security procedures shall be established for access to the territory of the Facility. The form of access and the security procedure shall be established by agreement between the Manager of the Facility and the Representative of Latvia.

Article 13

1. The Latvian Party shall provide for supplying the Facility with electric energy (transferring it from the Russian Federation) and water. The Russian Party shall be obliged to promptly make payment for transit of electric energy through the networks of the Latvian Republic according to the procedure and at the rates established by agreement with the Latvian Party. The Russian Party shall be obligated to promptly make payment for supply of water indicated in the present Article to the Facility according to the procedure and at the rates accepted in the Latvian Republic. Interruptions in the supply of electric energy or water that have arisen for reasons beyond the control of the Latvian Party and its services [(words indistinct)] shall not be regarded as a violation of the obligations of the Latvian Party.
2. Other services and deliveries shall be provided through the conclusion by the Manager of the Facility of the corresponding agreements with individuals and legal entities of the Latvian Republic. Disputes related to the fulfillment of these agreements shall be resolved according to the procedure determined by legislation of the Latvian Republic.

Article 14

1. For supervision and coordination of the execution of the present Agreement, a Combined Commission shall be created which shall consist of an equal number of representatives of both Parties and a representative or representatives of one of the international organizations to which both Parties belong.

The Parties shall be obligated to reach agreement on the organization to be invited and invite its representative or representatives before the present Agreement goes into effect. If the agreement is not reached before 31 August 1994, this representative or these representatives shall be appointed by the UN secretary general or the chairman of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Combined Commission, on the initiative of the Parties, or a representative of the aforementioned international organization, on the initiative of the Manager of the Facility or the Representative of Latvia, and also on its own initiative shall consider and resolve on the basis of a consensus any issue related to the execution of the present Agreement. Decisions of the Combined Commission shall be binding for the Manager of the Facility and the Representative of Latvia. If the Combined Commission cannot find a solution that satisfies the Parties within a month's time or comes to the conclusion that the question must be resolved at the governmental level, the question is turned over for the consideration of the governments of both Parties, which, if necessary, may agree to transfer the dispute for the consideration of the international court of the United Nations.

2. The Latvian Party shall provide members of the Combined Commission with the necessary documents for entering and remaining in the Latvian Republic. Members of the Combined Commission shall enjoy the same rights to visit the Facility as is enjoyed by the Representative of Latvia.
3. Sessions of the Combined Commission shall be conducted as necessary. Protocols of the sessions of the Combined Commission shall be submitted to the governments of both Parties. If a special session of the Combined Commission is convened at the request of the Manager of the Facility or the Representative of Latvia, the session of the Combined Commission shall be conducted within three days of the receipt of the request.

Article 15

1. In order to monitor the implementation of the present Agreement, inspection teams of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe shall be invited periodically. The schedule for these inspections during the course of the year shall be determined at the first session of the Combined Commission for the corresponding year.
2. Special inspection teams shall be invited on the initiative of the Latvian Party. All costs involved with these inspections shall be borne by the Party that initiates the invitation.

The premises of the Facility that are classified as indicated in Appendix No. 3 shall not be subject to inspection. The aforementioned shall also be observed upon application of point 6 of Article 5 of the present Agreement.

3. No more than two periodic and two special inspections shall be conducted each year.
4. If a special inspection team is invited, the Latvian Party within 48 hours before its arrival shall notify the Combined Commission and the Manager of the Facility, providing a list of the inspectors.
5. The inspectors, whose number must not exceed three, shall enjoy the same rights to visit the Facility as are enjoyed by the Representative of Latvia. The Representative of Latvia and the Manager of the Facility shall accompany the inspectors while they are on the territory of the Facility. The duration of one inspection must not exceed three days. Conclusions of the inspection team shall be turned over for familiarization to the Combined Commission, the Manager of the Facility, and the Representative of Latvia.
6. In addition to inspections included in the schedule drawn up by the Combined Commission, periodic inspections shall be conducted within three days after the termination of the temporary functioning of the Facility and also on the day of the expiration of the present Agreement.

Article 16

1. The period of temporary functioning of the Facility shall end on 31 August 1998.
2. The dismantling of the existing radar station shall begin on 1 September 1998 and end no later than 29 February 2000.

If before the end of the period of temporary functioning of the Facility a station to place it is put into operation outside the Latvian Republic, the Russian Party shall immediately notify the Latvian Party of this. And within 30 days after the replacement structure goes into operation, the dismantling of the Facility shall begin.

During the period of dismantling the structures indicated in Appendix No. 4 that are located on the territory of the Facility shall be removed and, if necessary, the land shall be recultivated.

During the period of dismantling the equipment shall be shipped or sold on the spot.

Dismantling work at the existing radar station envisioned by the present Agreement shall be conducted at the expense of the Russian Party. The dismantling may be carried out both by personnel working at the Facility and by individuals hired by the Russian Party especially for performing this task. When recruiting personnel for dismantling, preference shall be given to residents of the Latvian Republic.

3. If necessary the number of personnel employed in the dismantling work who are citizens of the Russian Federation may be increased by mutual consent of the Parties.

4. The Russian Party shall take measures to provide for the proper financing of the dismantling work.
5. The Latvian Party shall at its own expense disassemble the incomplete station or transform it into a facility for civilian purposes. After the signing of the present Agreement the section servicing the building of the station shall be turned over to the Latvian Party. The list of structures of the incomplete station and the boundaries of the section of area turned over for servicing the building of the incomplete station shall be given in Appendix No. 5 to the present Agreement. The Latvian Party shall not impede the dismantling conducted by the Russian Party or the shipment of equipment and components from the incomplete station or the section serving it.

The work for disassembling the incomplete station or transforming it into a facility for civilian purposes should not impede the functioning of the existing station. The Latvian Party shall bear responsibility, including material, if as a result of the aforementioned work harm is caused to the life and property of personnel servicing the Facility or members of their families, the station that is in operation, and also facilities related to it.

6. After the signing of the present Agreement the railside base for loading equipment and servicing its section of land in the village of Skrunda shall be turned over to the Latvian Party. The Latvian Party shall not impede free use, when the Russian Party requires it, of railroad sidings and the rail side base for loading equipment when shipping property and equipment of the Russian Party during the period of temporary functioning and dismantling.

Article 17

Calculations for rental payment and also payments related to the temporary functioning of the Facility and financing dismantling work shall be carried out in currency of the Latvian Republic through the correspondent subaccount of the institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation opened in one of the Latvian commercial banks according to the choice of the Russian Party.

Funds in the correspondent subaccount of the institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation shall be formed through transfer by the Russian Party of foreign currency to maintain the Facility and through other revenues.

Foreign currency from the Russian Party in the Latvian commercial bank shall be converted into Latvian lats and transferred at the expense of the institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in this bank according to the agreed-upon exchange rate that is oriented to the currency market of Latvia.

Article 18

1. Nothing in the present Agreement may be used to commit actions aimed against the sovereignty or interests of the security of the Latvian Republic.
2. The Russian Party shall be obligated not to conclude any agreements regarding the Facility with third countries without the consent of the Latvian side. This does not pertain to the right of the Russian Party to dispose of information obtained by the Facility.
3. The Russian Party shall be obligated before the present Agreement takes effect to submit to the Security Council of the United Nations a document confirming the guarantees from the Russian Federation that the present Agreement will not be used to commit actions directed against the sovereignty and interests of the security of the Latvian Republic.
4. Any attempt to resolve disputes or disagreements related to the present Agreement using the threat of force or the application of it shall be regarded as a threat to peace and international security which shall be subject to consideration in the Security Council of the United Nations in keeping with Article 39 of its Charter.

Article 19

The Parties shall not make any changes or additions to the present Agreement, shall not extend the period of effect of the Agreement, and shall not renew it.

Article 20

The present Agreement shall take force on 1 September 1994 under the condition that the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on conditions, time periods, and procedure for complete withdrawal from the territory of the Latvian Republic of armed forces of the Russian Federation and their legal position during the period of withdrawal has taken effect and armed forces of the Russian Federation have been completely withdrawn from the territory of the Latvian Republic. It shall remain in effect until the completion of the fulfillment of all of its provisions.

Article 21

The present Agreement shall be subject to registration in the Secretariat of the United Nations in keeping with Article 102 of the UN Charter.

Done in the city of 1994 in two copies, in the Russian and Latvian languages, each text having equal force.

Russian Civil Defense Ministry Aid to Georgia

94UM0333B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Ivan Sergeyev: "Russian Ministry for Emergencies Rushes to the Aid of Countrymen"]

[Text] This morning another humanitarian convoy set out for the Republic of Georgia from the city of Noginsk,

near Moscow. It was organized by the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters.

This time the assistance is intended for a Russian community of *dukhobortsy* [a religious sect which opposed the Orthodox Church] which settled in the south of Georgia more than 150 years ago. To carry out agricultural work, they will be supplied with 200 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel carried on 50 trucks. In the opinion of the First Deputy Ministry for Emergencies Yuri Vorobyev, this action must raise the morale of all of our countrymen who find themselves in difficult economic conditions outside the borders of Russia.

Admiral Kasatonov on Black Sea Fleet Problem

MK1504100094 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Apr 94 p 8

[Interview with Admiral Igor Kasatonov, deputy commander in chief of the Russian Navy, by Andrey Papushin: "I Hope Common Sense Will Prevail"—place, date not given; first seven paragraphs are introductory comments by Leonid Gvozdev]

[Text] A ball of problems, insults, agreements, and violations regarding the Black Sea Fleet is growing, threads are falling unevenly, loops are getting tighter... Those who are not winding or tightening it, but are just following the events may notice that any new knot emerges in the ball precisely when something goes wrong with politicians elsewhere, in a place fairly remote from Crimea or the Black Sea, and when they desperately need to distract society's attention.

I will not recall ill-conceived, and sometimes even provocative, actions, the starting point of which is located in Ukraine—more than enough has already written about that. But on our, Russian part there have been plenty of them, too. Suffice it to recall at least the explosive decree on Crimea by the former Supreme Soviet...

Meanwhile, the matter is as simple as it is complicated. Maybe the only thing we need is to say aloud for all to hear a few obvious axioms, however unpleasant they might sound to a Russian ear. Such as, for instance: Crimea is part of the territory of friendly Ukraine. Just say so and stop kindling dangerous and futile hopes of many (yes, many!) residents of the peninsula. After all, a bloc called "Russia" has already won an election there! (I wonder how Russian patriots and "patriots" would react if a party named after a neighboring state that has territorial claims on us were to win elections in a Russian oblast?) I do not know what the activists of Crimea's "Russia" are seeking and what their program is in the long run, but I can guess what these games may end in. War and bloodshed. Nothing less.

But Ukraine seemed about to be ready to give up the Black Sea Fleet. Or rather to sell its share. We too would have agreed on the lease of land and water territories one way or another. It is clear even to a fool that the maintenance of the Black Sea Fleet is too costly for it.

Just a little more bargaining and there you are... But who, please, tell me, would constantly try to humiliate and maliciously provoke its partner while bargaining is under way?

Don't you see, dear readers, that the Black Sea Fleet problem and that of Baykonur are very much alike? But we did resolve the space center dispute! After some bargaining the two sides resolved it to mutual satisfaction. How could it be otherwise! Now imagine journalists and politicians screaming day in and day out into Kazakhstan's ear: "*Baykonur is ours! Ours!! OURS!!!*" Would we gain much by such bargaining?

There is something to ponder here.

Turning to Adm. Kasatonov, deputy commander in chief of the Russian Navy, we, of course, did not know in advance what answers he might give. We would have published them in any way, but now that the text of the conversation is ready and approved, we can welcome with satisfaction and understandable relief its calm and businesslike tone, its clear and realistic content. In my view, this is precisely the case where a trite expression—a balanced approach—would be pertinent.

[Papushin] Igor Vladimirovich, your name has been justifiably identified by our countrymen with Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. But Moscow is a landlocked city. This is why no one is better equipped than you—who commanded the Black Sea Fleet at what may be the most dramatic juncture of its modern history—to tell Muscovites about the situation in which people who have defended Russia's southern borders have found themselves.

Could you, please, briefly characterize the origins and the essence of the problems the Black Sea Fleet sailors have to solve at this point.

[Kasatonov] The problem of the Black Sea Fleet emerged in January 1992, that is, at a time when Ukraine began setting up its own armed forces.

Ukraine's initial stance on the Black Sea Fleet was stated by President Kravchuk in a protocol of the working meeting of the CIS heads of states on 16 January 1992, which said: "The Navy of the former USSR is part of the strategic forces of the Commonwealth, except for the forces of the Black Sea Fleet that will become part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces." The last phrase (on the Black Sea Fleet) was included in the protocol personally by the Ukrainian president. As early as April 1992, however, an edict was issued whereby Black Sea Fleet forces on Ukrainian territory were proclaimed part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and only a part of the ships and units was placed under the operational command of the CIS Strategic Forces Command. Following measure taken by Russia, the edict was suspended. Since that time, for nearly two years already, talks on the Black Sea Fleet have been under way at various levels between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Three interstate agreements have been signed—the Dagomys agreement of 23 June 1992; the Yalta agreement of 3 August 1992; the Moscow agreement of 17 June 1993; and also the Massandra protocol of 3 September 1993.

In the Dagomys agreement, the sides expressed their readiness to develop their relations as friendly states and to start working out without delay a full-scale political treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of continuing talks on setting up in the Black Sea the Russian and Ukrainian Navies (on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet). They also agreed to use on a contract basis the existing system of deployment and logistic support, and also to refrain from unilateral actions with regard to the Fleet until talks are completed.

The Yalta agreement established a transition period (up to 1995 inclusive) to form the Russian and Ukrainian Navies in the Black Sea. The two sides agreed to bring the Black Sea Fleet up to strength with conscripts in an equal proportion (50-50) and to conclude follow-up agreements to specify provision of the Yalta accord.

In the Moscow agreement, the sides specified that they would complete the formation of the Russian and Ukrainian Navies by 1996; the Fleet would be split equally (50-50), same as the cost of its financing before the split is completed. At the same time, the Russian Federation and Ukraine stressed once again that **any unilateral actions with regard to the Black Sea Fleet during the transition period are prohibited.**

Finally, in the Massandra protocol the presidents agreed that the entire Black Sea Fleet would be turned over to Russian jurisdiction along with its entire infrastructure in Crimea and that Russia would compensate Ukraine for its share...

I have deliberately characterized all the agreements so that readers will understand the problems [as published, apparently "steps" or "measures"] that have been taken to find a solution. However, they have not been realized, but not through the Russian side's fault.

By now only a few minor provisions of the Yalta agreement have effectively been implemented: On the appointment of the Black Sea Fleet commander directly subordinated to the two presidents, and on bringing the Fleet up to strength with Russian and Ukrainian conscripts, each side providing 50 percent. As for the provision on joint financing and on banning unilateral actions, they have constantly been violated by the Ukrainian side.

Since January 1992 alone the Ukrainian authorities have taken more than 70 unlawful actions against the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian leadership (primarily the Defense Ministry) is taking economic, political, legislative, and information measures aimed at deciding the Black Sea Fleet's fate in its favor. For instance, in order to persuade wavering servicemen to take an Ukrainian loyalty oath they have been promised various kinds of benefits. With regard to those who remain true to the oath they once took, various methods have been

invented to frighten them and to infringe on their rights. Where the situation allowed, individual units and ships of the Black Sea Fleet have been placed under the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The seizure and hijacking to Odessa of the SKR-112 ship; the detention of a Pacific Fleet floating dry dock for more than two years amount to unprecedented actions violating all tenets of international law... First the Ukrainian side prevented Russia from financing the Black Sea Fleet thus trying to break the Black Sea Fleet sailors; then—having realized that it is unable to maintain the Fleet—it completely stopped financing it in September 1993. Moreover, it has imposed on a fleet subordinated to the Ukrainian president customs duties and a land tax.

The Russian Defense and Foreign Ministries' protests against these unlawful actions have fallen on deaf ears; not a single illegal enactment has been rescinded after the protests were lodged.

From what I have said it becomes clear that the Black Sea Fleet sailors are facing mounting problems, including the status of the city of Sevastopol, dual citizenship, the logistic support and maintenance of the Fleet, social safety nets, housing problems. And also the forcible collection of taxes for land use and customs duties for cargoes brought in for the Fleet's needs from funds earmarked to pay money allowances to Black Sea Fleet servicemen and civilian employees.

In addition, there are problems in the Black Sea Fleet that are typical of all fleets—first of all a lack of funds for repair and the maintenance of the ships' technical readiness.

These are, of course, the key problems.

[Papushin] What way of resolving the problems do you see?

[Kasatonov] By implementing the Massandra protocol of 3 September 1993. An agreement should be drawn up "whereby the entire Black Sea Fleet with its entire infrastructure in Crimea will be operated by Russia and obtain Russian symbols." This fundamental decision would make it possible to remove the Black Sea Fleet issue from the agenda of talks between Russia and Ukraine and to resolve the main problems facing the Fleet. The main thing is that this would meet the expectations of the personnel.

But at present the talks between state delegations have stalemated: The Ukrainian side is for the umpteenth time trying to shirk the implementation of earlier agreements.

[Papushin] What steps are the Russian Navy command taking to settle the situation around the Black Sea Fleet?

[Kasatonov] Owing to subordinating the Black Sea Fleet directly to the presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the possibilities of the Black Sea Fleet command are limited. At the same time, we constantly analyze and assess the situation in the Fleet. The basis for such an analysis is provided by reports from the command of the Fleet and the work by officers of the

central Navy apparatus in the Fleet. This makes it possible to react to changes in the situation in a timely manner and file corresponding reports with proposals to the leadership and the president of Russia.

During the first quarter of this year alone, the Navy has lodged protests with Ukraine's Defense Ministry, and submitted reports to the government and the president of Russia concerning the illegal actions on the part of the Ukrainian side in violation of the understandings reached (the seizure—in December 1993—of the Naval Engineering Service departments, and the Directorates of the work supervisor in Nikolayev, Odessa, and Izmail; in February 1994, of a hospital base and a naval hospital in Nikolayev; and in March 1994, of the naval sick bay in Ochakov). Such protests lodged over last two years are without number.

The Navy command, together with qualified experts, takes part in the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet, works out proposals for the inclusion in the drafts of negotiation documents, provides necessary information to the state delegation, carries out special expert assessment of proposals being considered.

The questions of social protection for the Fleet's personnel are also in the center of attention. Notwithstanding all the difficulties with financing, and despite the hurdles raised by Ukraine's Defense Ministry, funds are found to provide allowances and other types of supply to the personnel in a timely manner.

[Papushin] What is the Fleet's material-technical and moral state today?

[Kasatonov] The Fleet's vague status and the Ukrainian side's actions aimed at hampering its activity put additional limits on supplying the Black Sea Fleet with some types of materiel. The customs duties (up to 0.15 percent of the cost) levied by Ukraine on imported military equipment, and the introduced rent on land limit the Fleet's possibility for buying the necessary materiel, for repairing ships and vessels. For example, as little as a third of the ships needing repair can be taken care of in the current year, and the Fleet command is unfortunately powerless to help it in this matter. Unless the status of the Black Sea Fleet has been determined, it is impossible to appropriate funds for capital construction, the construction of housing and of sociocultural facilities.

Such a state of affairs causes considerable difficulties in carrying out combat training and maintaining the Fleet's forces in the prescribed readiness to carry out its assigned mission.

Meanwhile the morale of Black Sea Fleet personnel today affords continued maintenance of the Fleet's forces in the prescribed degree of combat readiness. I would like to underline with deep satisfaction that, in this complex situation, the overwhelming majority of the personnel remain true to the oath of loyalty and, despite the persistent attempts by Ukraine's Defense Ministry to

force them into taking the oath of loyalty to Ukraine, continue to carry out their military duty.

Unfortunately, the Fleet's location on the territory of another state makes it for the time being impossible to extend to its servicemen the rights and benefits provided for in Russia. This to a certain extent affects the moral climate in the military collectives. But we are taking all possible measures to solve the fundamental legal questions applicable to the Fleet's personnel.

[Papushin] Is the Fleet capable of carrying out missions assigned to it?

[Kasatonov] At the present time—despite all the political and material difficulties it is experiencing, and given the makeup of the forces and weapons for naval combat, technical state, the amount and state of training of its personnel, and the provision of all types of materiel—the Black Sea Fleet retains the capability to carry out the assigned missions and, what is more, is a stabilizing factor in the Black Sea region.

The standard missions of the Fleet are to repulse the strikes of a possible adversary from the sea, to protect merchant shipping, to participate together with other services and arms in carrying out of joint missions in the maritime sector, among a range of other missions.

The presence in the Black Sea zone of regional conflicts has additionally set the Black Sea Fleet the missions of a peacekeeping nature. Suffice it to say that, ever since the armed conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia broke out (in August 1992) the Fleet's forces have been periodically called upon to evacuate refugees, escort convoys with humanitarian aid to civilian populations provided by Russia and the other CIS countries, provide materiel to combined units of the Russian Federation Armed Forces present in the conflict zone. Over the period, the Fleet's ships and vessels have carried nearly 70,000 people and 45,000 tonnes of cargo. For example, in August 1992 a great number of vacationers were urgently shipped from the territory of Abkhazia, including 58 children evacuated from a Young Pioneer camp in Pitsunda at the Ukraine president's request. A Black Sea task force (made up of eight ships, two vessels, and a reinforced marine battalion) was guarding and defending the sea port and the rail center in Poti and protected shipping along the coastline of Georgia and Abkhazia in the period between 1 and 30 November on the basis of a decision made by the governments of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.

Those are far from all the missions the Black Sea Fleet happened to carry out in modern conditions and which the Fleet's personnel is carrying out in a proper fashion.

[Papushin] Some writers (and occasionally even politicians) maintain that a single and powerful Black Sea Fleet is an extravagant luxury, especially given that the situation in the Black Sea does not threaten Russia's security. Why is so much importance being attached to the preservation of a single Black Sea Fleet?

[Kasatonov] As a military man who, in addition, has for a long time dealt with the problem of ensuring the protection of Russia's interests in the Black Sea region, I cannot agree with such statements.

The Black Sea Fleet has always played a major role in stabilizing the situation in the southwestern strategic sector, including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Stability in this region has been ensured by achieving a strategic balance of forces, and the violation of this balance can lead to developments in the military-political situation unfavorable to Russia. At this stage already one can see increasing naval activity by foreign states, primarily Turkey... The disintegration of the single Black Sea Fleet, sought by Ukraine (and, as a result, the declining combat capability of its forces in the central and western parts of the Black Sea), will allow the Turkish Navy to become the leader in the Black Sea region. This will enable Turkey to resolve its geopolitical tasks of gaining and consolidating its influence on the Black Sea basin countries, which Russia has been fighting to prevent for several centuries....

Furthermore, as the situation shows, the unceasing regional conflicts in the eastern part of the Black Sea require a sufficient amount of mobile forces capable, with ground communications disrupted, of ensuring the operation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces units stationed on the territory of Transcaucasian CIS member states. These tasks are now being accomplished successfully by Black Sea Fleet forces.

In peacetime, ways of safeguarding Russia's interests in the southwestern sector lie primarily in creating a reliable defense system allowing, with any (even the most unfavorable) situation, to prevent potential damage for the country. This system should envision the creation of stable and favorable operational conditions allowing to maintain effective control of the sea and the adjacent coast.

Clearly, such tasks are within the range of only such a single and sufficiently powerful fleet as the Black Sea Fleet.

There is also another aspect to this problem: Close interrelation of all the Fleet structures to ensure its normal functioning.

We have always acted on the assumption that the Fleet's missions can be achieved only with the entire strength of the Black Sea Fleet, in interaction with other fleets and branches of the Armed Forces. In other words, only a single fleet is capable of ensuring the requisite concentration of efforts and most effective accomplishment of missions in areas of threat.

On the other hand, Ukraine's unilateral seizure, for instance, of a Black Sea Fleet unit on Zmeinyy Peninsula, designed to monitor the situation and ensure the security of navigation in the western part of the Black Sea, has led to a substantial weakening of the Black Sea Fleet capabilities for early detection of foreign warships and aircraft.

In upholding the preservation of a single Black Sea Fleet, we relate this closely also to the interests of the people serving there: The Fleet's division can have most severe complications for their fate.

[Papushin] Has the situation around the Black Sea Fleet changed following presidential elections in Crimea?

[Kasatonov] Yes, it has generally changed. Since the moment he took office Yuriy Meshkov and his military adviser have stated repeatedly:

- a) the need to downsize Ukrainian troops on the peninsula (in the past year alone their strength has grown from 18,000 to 51,000);
- b) the sufficiency of the Black Sea Fleet forces for protecting the southern sea borders of Ukraine and Russia;
- c) the promotion of businesslike contacts with the Black Sea Fleet Command on major aspects of the military-political situation in Crimea.

Such an approach, as well as a number of other statements by the Crimean president with respect to Kiev officialdom, was not slow in producing a reaction: On 1 April 1994 L. Kravchuk appointed his special representative to Crimea.

In view of a change of leadership in Crimea it has also attracted increased attention from the U.S. Embassy in Kiev and U.S. Ambassador Miller in particular. During a recent visit to Sevastopol he stated that he wants to study the problems of the Fleet and Crimea personally.... Regrettably, Russian Ambassador Smolyakov has not even once visited Sevastopol in the past year. On the other hand, the city's problems have evoked a response from the mayors of Moscow, Volgograd, Krasnodar, and Belgorod.

With these changes in the situation, Ukraine's Air Force has intensified its activity around the Black Sea Fleet. Statements by its command have appeared in the media about the Black Sea Fleet's "illegal" presence in Crimea, the need to return to the Yalta agreements and to renounce the Massandra protocol. Work is under way to move the Ukrainian Air Force Headquarters to the territory of the former Nakhimov Higher Naval Academy (at present the headquarters is located on the territory of a former military construction NCO school). This is an attempt by Ukraine's Air Force to strengthen its presence in Crimea.

[Papushin] How do you assess the efforts by the Moscow City Hall and government to render assistance to the Fleet and Sevastopol?

[Kasatonov] Only positively. We are grateful to the Muscovites and Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov personally for reviving a dying tradition: Sponsorship by oblasts, krays, and cities of the Navy's battleships and units. As for Sevastopol, thanks to the Moscow City Hall and government, a project has been launched to build a 100-apartment residential complex for the seamen's families. The first floor of a 15-apartment section has been put up already, and a foundation has been laid for a 20-apartment section. Work is proceeding on schedule. The 150 million rubles transferred to the personnel of

the Moskva cruiser have been used to buy TV sets, VCR's, and musical instruments; psychological relaxation rooms are being set up for servicemen where they will be able to relax and spend their leisure hours effectively.

Out the 30 tonnes of humanitarian supplies, the Fleet's servicemen have by unanimous consent donated five tonnes to helicopter pilots, five tonnes to the marines, one tonne to a kindergarten, and one tonne to a hospital. A share has also been ceded to ailing war veterans.

Moscow's example of maintaining direct patronage links has been followed by cities and districts in Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays and several regions in Volga Oblast. Documents are being prepared for Moscow Oblast's sponsorship program for the Navy's flagship, the USSR Admiral Kuznetsov cruiser.... We hope that this benevolent wave of sponsorship will also reach other regions of Russia.

As for Sevastopol, it will again be waiting for its patrons: For the celebration of the 50th anniversary of liberation. On 7 May groups of entertainers, artists, musicians, and writers will arrive there, and we are sure that these meetings will benefit all.

Incidentally, at present intensive preparations are beginning to mark the 50th anniversary of the city's liberation: The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has allocated two billion karbovanets for these purposes. According to preliminary reports from the organizing committee, approximately 1,300 veterans of the Great Patriotic War from other Commonwealth countries and cities have expressed an interest in taking part in the festivities.

I very much hope that common sense will prevail. That the fate of the Black Sea Fleet will be decided in accordance with the Massandra Protocol and that the Fleet will continue in the future fittingly to ensure protection of Russia's borders from southern maritime directions, serving as a guarantor of stability in the entire Black Sea region.

[Papushin] Thank you very much.

UKRAINE

Problems in Coordinating Support for Air Force Units

94UM0324A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
15 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Captain Oleksandr Dranikov, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric "They Serve the People of Ukraine": "If Need Be, We Will Accept Both the 'Shuttle' and 'Buran'—Say the Men from the X Aviation Equipment Command"]

[Text] We had heard of the airfield located near the small Ukrainian town of Tokmak while still in the Western Troop Grouping. Nearly four years ago, there were plans

to transfer one of the aviation regiments of the Western Troop Grouping to Tokmak. The pilots who had flown reconnaissance in Ukraine gave high praise to both the airfield and the people serving there. And why not? It is located in the beautiful steppes of Tauria. The runway is wonderfully suited to any type of airplane. The airfield has everything that an aviation unit needs: Parking areas for the planes, the necessary communications facilities, and modern equipment. In short, the aviators of the Western Troop Grouping would have been only too glad to serve there. Unfortunately, however, this was not meant to be. What ensued was a flaunting of sovereignties, as it was then called, and the aviation regiment flew off under the Russian flag to Kursk Oblast.

Meanwhile, the Tokmak airfield continued its quiet, provincial existence. But not for long. A storm was moving in from the Black Sea, even though Tokmak is some distance away. At any moment, the Sevastopol clouds were threatening to explode in thunder and lightning...

By now, the reader has probably figured out that the aviation equipment command [aviatsiyno-tekhnichna komendatura] has no connection with the customary duties of military service. There is also no military police unit [hauptvakhta] for offending airplanes. The job of the aviation equipment command is to do what needs to be done to make possible distant flights by individual airplanes or groups of airplanes. That was also the job of the personnel of the airfield—servicing the aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet. They were subordinated, accordingly, to the command of the Black Sea Fleet, and they tried to serve in a manner that would not bring dishonor to the naval uniform. And they succeeded. There were no complaints from the Black Sea Fleet command—but only up to a given moment.

After Ukraine became an independent state, the personnel of the aviation equipment command held a general meeting at which they decided to take the Military Oath of Loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

Incidentally, this was the second unit in the Black Sea Fleet, after the battalion of marines, to hoist the yellow-and-blue flag... This raising of the flag, however, was only a symbolic action, inasmuch as the unit had taken the Ukrainian oath three days before the State Flag of Ukraine was approved.

This action did not get a great deal of publicity—after all, all sorts of things were then happening in the provinces. But the response from Sevastopol was lightning swift. The then Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Igor Kasatonov, proclaimed the Commander of the unit, Viktor Petrovskyy, all but a criminal and ordered him to be dismissed from his job and arrested.

Shortly after this, the unit was visited by a Commission, headed by Major-General Borys Shevchenko, Chief of Rear Services of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. A campaign was launched to persuade the unit to renounce its Ukrainian oath. But the servicemen of the Aviation

Equipment Command remained steadfast. Then came the threats. When this also failed to produce results, an order was issued to hand over all the existing equipment to the main aviation base of the Black Sea Fleet. This involved no more and no less than 179 special motor vehicles. Warrant Officer Kostyantyn Romanenko, who was responsible for the vehicles, refused to carry out the order. Major Viktor Petrenko also regarded this order to be illegal. And so they managed to keep the equipment. But the Black Sea specialists would not have been rear-service personnel had they left empty-handed. Failing to get the equipment, they promptly began to haggle... over the production of the subsidiary plot. And they succeeded in leaving with 70 hogs, 10 cows, more than 200 rams, and a couple hundred chickens. If it weren't so sad, it would be funny, as they say.

After taking everything they could take, the Black Sea Fleet command progressively began to reduce all deliveries of supplies to the airfield. There was chaos at the top, but it was not the staff officials who suffered. This ambiguity—although the aviation command [aviakomendatura] had taken the Ukrainian oath, it was still subordinated to the Black Sea Fleet—produced all sorts of oddities. The story of the handing over of the grunting and mooing livestock pales in comparison with the incident involving the missiles that followed. Yes, you read it right, air-to-air missiles.

It so happened that the fighter aviation regiment that was then stationed in Zaporizhzhya had given the unit commanded by Major Petrovskyy 83 missiles for safe-keeping. Shortly thereafter, the aviation regiment was transferred to Kazakhstan, and the responsible officials simply forgot about the missiles. The Major spent two years corresponding with various staffs before he found the owners of the missiles. For two years, the unit diligently looked after the missiles, while military officials of various ranks literally kicked around Petrovskyy's request from office to office and from republic to republic.

...Today, as we sat in a sheltered command post, Major Viktor Petrovskyy and his Deputy for Educational and Social-psychological Work, Senior Lieutenant Vasyl Romanenko, laughed as they told this story. But how much civic courage did Petrovskyy need to hold out then, at the dawn of the formation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Viktor Mykolayovych had many years of service behind him at a nuclear testing range in Novaya Zemlya. But here, on the mainland, as it were, he had neither picket, nor yard [i.e. nothing]. How would he and his family have managed if he had been thrown overboard from his unit in the Black Sea Fleet? Where would he have been able to turn had this happened? To his old parents in a village near Kryvyy Rih? This does not even bear thinking about...

A little over a year and a half ago, the tribulations of the aviation personnel in the small Ukrainian town finally came to an end. At the request of the commander of the unit, the aviation equipment command was made part of

the 5th Army of the Ukrainian Air Force. And what did the "wings of the Fatherland" get (and not only they) by taking in the Black Sea Fleet's "foundling"? In addition to a wonderful airfield, a large amount of needed supplies that are in critically short supply. Here are but two figures. The "ownerless" missiles were not the only thing that the unit managed to keep. For example, of the 35 metric tons of fuel used by the 5th Army for flights in 1993, 6 metric tons came from the storage tanks at the Tokmak airfield. Major Petrovskyy's subordinates also helped the young Ukrainian fleet. More than 2,000 full sets of naval issue clothing were handed over to the Ukrainian Navy.

Even though we do not serve our Fatherland to grow rich, still, what did the aviators get in return? And here we have some interesting numbers. In the last five years, for its 34 officers and warrant officers, the unit received 14 apartments, nine of which were occupied by their new owners in 1993. For the sake of comparison: Between 1954 and 1989, the unit was assigned only nine apartments. While not all the officers have yet received apartments, all those who wanted a household plot got one.

It should be noted that the success in solving questions involving the social welfare of the servicemen is due to the active support of the city authorities. Yevhen Karban, the mayor of Tokmak, has done a great deal for the servicemen. They came to him with a whole variety of requests, and he always showed understanding for their needs and did everything in his power to help them. This year, the city is prepared to give the unit four to five apartments (this means that the housing problem will be removed from the agenda for the next few years). Obviously, on condition that the Ministry of Defense contributes its share to the construction of this housing. I should note that the prices at which the city is offering the military the apartments are more than reasonable.

Small wonder that the prestige of serving in the military under these conditions is not falling in the unit but rising! Just before I visited the unit, a Certification Commission met on selecting candidates for contract military service. There were three to four applicants for each vacant private's or sergeant's post.

Solving the question of contract servicemen is of great help to the airfield. Judge for yourselves: The 34 officers and warrant officers and 20 term servicemen are responsible for 179 motor vehicles, 150 of which are in their safekeeping, and 418 hectares of land housing more than 30 objects and communications facilities [obyekty and komunikatsiyi]. Thus, every member of the collective has to do his own job and the next man's, as they say.

For example, Warrant Officer Kostyantyn Romanenko, whom we mentioned earlier, is simultaneously the chief of the weather station and responsible for the equipment being looked after by the unit. Warrant Officer Petro Nayden holds three jobs simultaneously—he is in charge of PPM, the munitions supply

warehouse, and unit's chemical service. Fortunately, guard duty in the unit is performed by militarized security forces [vovenizovana okhorona]. The servicemen guard only two of eight posts.

Still, none of the servicemen complain about their lot. They work hard and wait for those in the higher staff to finally listen to what they think. The thing is that for the last two years, the unit commander has submitted numerous proposals regarding improving the unit's organizational and staff structure. So far, there has been neither welcome nor farewell, as the saying goes. This is the only problem that the collective cannot resolve on its own.

For example, the problem of heating both living quarters and office premises seemed much more complicated, but they solved it! It had been decided at the outset that the unit would get its heat from a boiler that uses oil fuel. The problems with oil fuel are well known. Still, the servicemen did not give up. Thank God, there is no shortage in the unit of sensible people who are jacks of all trades. They reduced the space they used, closed down some of their facilities, and put electric boilers heated by water in others. Once again, with the help and support of the city authorities and local industrial enterprises...

I was about to leave the aviation equipment command on a gloomy February morning. Major Petrovskyy was handing out assignments for the day. His somewhat hoarse voice could be heard quite well near the headquarters. As usual, there were more jobs than people. Nonetheless, the staff orderly [dnyuvalnyy shtabu], Private Vitaliy Malyshev, who could also hear everything the major was saying, said with a smile on his face:

"There are only a few of us, but we wear sailors' T-shirts [i.e., we can do anything]. If need be, we'll accept both the Shuttle and Buran."

I am convinced that his joke contains a lion's share of truth.

State of Ukraine's Aviation Industry

94UM0342A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 11, 23-29 Mar 94 p 10

[Interview with Genrikh Ongirskiy, deputy general designer at the "Antonov" Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex, by Yuriy Kozlov under "Aircraft" rubric: "Water Is Up to Our Chin but We Are Still Breathing"]

[Text] The "Antonov" Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex [ANTK] was established in 1946 by the outstanding aircraft designer Oleg Antonov. Since that time more than 100 types and modifications of aircraft of different classes and purposes have been built. Apparently there was no one in the USSR and there is now no one in the CIS who has not flown in AN aircraft at least once in his life. Transport aircraft such as the "Ruslan" or

"Mriya," passenger aircraft, specialized aircraft for agriculture, aerial photography, and forest firefighting, polar aircraft, and other AN's are being exported to 42 countries of the world.

The disintegration of the Union may have hit the aerospace industry of the once united country hardest of all. The "Antonov" ANTK was afflicted with the same problems as other enterprises of the branch that suddenly found themselves on different sides of borders and customhouses. Difficulties with component parts, non-payments, low wages, cutbacks, the loss of specialists, and spasmodic searches for new partners—all this is also happening at "Antonov." Nevertheless, the aviation scientific-technical complex is continuing to develop new aircraft and to modify models that were built earlier. The following aircraft are in the stage of research, project planning, or production: AN-218, AN-180, AN-140, AN-138, AN-70T, AN-74T-200, AN-74TK-200, AN-72P (patrol aircraft), AN-32 (polar aircraft), and other heavy, superheavy, and multipurpose models.

Is it possible for the aerospace complex divided between the countries of the CIS to work for the good of the new states or are Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the other republics of the former USSR destined to become "aviation boondocks"? "This must not be allowed, otherwise our competitors will immediately replace us in the world and domestic markets," thinks Genrikh Ongirskiy, deputy general designer at the "Antonov" ANTK.

[Kozlov] Genrikh Genrikhovich, you must agree that only a superpower can afford to have and develop an aerospace industry. At one time the USSR was such a superpower. Now there is no USSR. What is the state of its aerospace industry?

[Ongirskiy] I think that despite all the political and economic difficulties Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—the largest aviation plant in the former Union is located there—are successfully preserving the scientific-technical potential of the recently united complex. Although, of course, young specialists are leaving us.

[Kozlov] Are you trying to say that the complex remains alive because of the veterans who have nowhere to go?

[Ongirskiy] Everywhere in the world it is above all the people who have worked for many years in the aviation and aerospace industry who are most appreciated there. Their knowledge and experience are considered to be national property. When such a specialist in the United States, for example, leaves a firm, he is obliged to leave his address and telephone number so that at any moment they can find him and hire him or invite him for consultation. Here, let us say in the CIS, it is dedicated people who work in aviation. There are practically no random people. I, for example, joined an air club at the age of 12 and took the traditional route: I built models, was the champion of the Union in the sport of model airplane building, did parachute jumping, and flew on a glider. I have nowhere to go from aviation and will

remain there until the end. And there are many people like me. For this reason, a core work force has remained at practically all aviation firms.

[Kozlov] The organizational will has disappeared, as has the state that spared no budgetary funds for the development of aviation firms.

[Ongirskiy] I cannot agree that this will no longer exists. We just received an invitation to a meeting in Moscow, where the problems in the aviation industry will be discussed. And such meetings are held regularly. The Russian aircraft TU-334 has been included in the program for Ukraine. Nor is Russia refusing our aircraft. We have very close ties with Omsk, Novosibirsk, Arsenyev, and Samara. The branch will not perish. The political storms will die down. And world practice indicates that aviation firms combine their efforts. Today, hardly anyone can accomplish anything alone at an economic advantage for himself—project planning, construction, and testing of new aircraft. The world has the American, European, and former Soviet aerospace complexes. To destroy our complex would mean not only to lag behind for decades but also to create insoluble economic difficulties for Russia and for Ukraine.

[Kozlov] How would you characterize Ukraine's aviation industry?

[Ongirskiy] Today it is 300,000 people and 30 enterprises of different kinds. I am not talking about space but only about aviation. The world's largest plant for the series production of aircraft engines is located in Zaporozhye. It produces 5,000 aircraft engines a year! Naturally, some of the engines are sent to Russia. High-quality materials come from Russia. How can one destroy this?

[Kozlov] There is probably no need to ask about the economic state of the "Antonov" firm. I understand that it is bad. So how bad is it? Can you see light at the end of the tunnel?

[Ongirskiy] Most of the workers here are graduates of the Kharkov Aviation Institute. Those from my class are also working for Tupolev, Mikoyan, and Ilyushin. The economic situation is about the same in all aviation firms. As Reagan said, the water is up to our chin but we are still breathing.

[Kozlov] Probably some are not pleased about this. Yes, there are specialists who are dedicated to aviation but there are also simply qualified workers and engineers who are doing their work well. It is easy to lose them but to hire and train others....

[Ongirskiy] I know from my own friends what it is to shut down a plant for two or three months and then to start it up again. People pilfer everything, they break window shutters and cut wires, and they carry off telephones and disassemble machine tools. Later on it is very difficult to restore everything. And the equipment is designed in such a way that the more it works they better

it works. It must not be stopped. Everything must keep turning, be lubricated, and wear. The human system is very complex and specific. People lose their skills quickly. I worked as a lathe hand before being trained at the institute. You come back from vacation and you have to regain your skills. Engineering and production have a concept called school. It is the continual transfer of experience and knowledge. The most important task for us today is to preserve the school. Because of the financial difficulties, we have to separate ourselves from our pensioners, people with good health, clear minds, and a strong spirit. They ought to be teaching the young people. By the way, the so-called tutorship came to us from the West. They leave pensioners in the firms and pay them money to come see what is going on, give advice, explain things, and help. Today young specialists do not have the opportunity to go the way that the patriarchs of aviation went. They know how to use computers and they know a lot about their speciality but they lack experience. And experience is the most valuable thing in aviation. That is what they tell us at Boeing and Lockheed. If we lose the school, then entire generations of specialists will "fall out" of aviation.

[Kozlov] Today the prestige of the former Soviet aviation has been substantially undermined. Accidents happen and aircraft crash and people have begun to discriminate against our technology. What is the explanation for this? Is it our general collapse or have we already begun to fall hopelessly behind in aviation?

[Ongirskiy] I would not agree with this. I regularly read information about my specialty. Here is an example: 700 aircraft of the Boeing Company have to be returned for reworking because some defects have been discovered in the tightening of the bolts fastening the engines. It turns out that they were tightened too much on some aircraft and not enough on others. Or remember the recent accident in the skies over Holland. No, our aircraft and especially military aircraft are by no means the worst in the world. It is no accident that there is so much interest in us at all kinds of exhibitions, air parades, and air shows. As for the accidents, they happen not just in the sky. Nuclear reactors blow up, ships and trains collide, and oil pipelines burn. This has to do with the general decline of discipline and the spiritual malaise in the country. Technology requires constant attention and servicing. For the time being, we are able to maintain the level of safety and airworthiness at the necessary level in aviation.

[Kozlov] Still, aircraft are crashing.

[Ongirskiy] Today some strange commercial structures are being established that are buying some depreciated aircraft and hiring pilots who have been dismissed from aviation and have no right to fly. Dispatchers, technicians, engineers, and ground flight support personnel are all living people who have to earn a wage. Their labor is very stressful. If a person at work is thinking about how to feed his family rather than about his work, then naturally there will be breakdowns.

[Kozlov] Many think that the economic policy of the Ukrainian Government is changing in the direction of more realism, if we can put it this way. Is there a mutual understanding between your firm and the government?

[Ongirskiy] There is. I personally, for example, am worried about the upcoming elections for the Supreme Soviet. If those who come to power are people who think that Ukraine should be an agrarian country and that it has no need for aircraft and space, then this will be a disaster.

[Kozlov] What, in your view, must be done so that the economic reforms in Ukraine will take place with fewer losses?

[Ongirskiy] It is hard to say. Sometimes we put it this way: "It will be good just if they do not interfere with us." I do not like people who have to destroy things: industry, economic ties, and relationships between nations. People must create and not destroy.

Military Prosecutor on Crime in Army

*WS1404133094 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 8 Apr 94 p 2*

[Interview with General Major Volodymyr Melnyk, Ukraine's deputy prosecutor general, by Volodymyr Cherkas; place and date not given: "Crimes Are Crimes Also in the Army"—first paragraph is HOLOS UKRAYINY introduction]

[Text] A session at Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office was discussing what seemed an individual case: Why legal proceedings against serviceman V. Bobrov had been discontinued. In issue No. 45 of 11 March 1994 our newspaper had written an article on this case, entitled "Scene of Crime—Barracks." That is why our reporter was invited to attend the session. General Major Volodymyr Melnyk, Ukraine's deputy prosecutor general, kept asking his subordinates: "Who discontinued the hearing of this case? On what grounds?" In response to this, the participants portrayed the criminal situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the tough situation of military prosecutorial bodies in such a way that it was hard to believe this was true. This prompted a newspaper reporter to conduct an interview with the deputy prosecutor general.

[Cherkas] Are numerous violations of the law really flourishing in the Ukrainian Army?

[Melnyk] Everything that you heard at the session is true. Violations of accepted norms in interpersonal relations, ultra vires acts, dodging of military service, embezzlements, thefts of military equipment and property have recently become commonplace. For instance in 1993, the number of violations of statute provisions that regulate relations between servicemen increased by 19 times in general. In particular, in Defense Ministry troops the growth rate was 34 percent. Soldiers are often "educated" by means of battery; the hazing of conscripts

reigns in many military units; order is built on the "punch the mug" principle. The number of cases of battery increased by more than 70 percent. Do you understand what this means? This is mass bashing!

Here is an example. At the beginning of March, six sergeants from the Chernihiv garrison were brought before the court. They had been drunk and had beaten up their 66 subordinates so severely that one of the soldiers died. This had been done right in front of the company duty officer who had done nothing to calm down the drunkards. On 16 March, a "senior" soldier and a conscript quarrelled about lack of bread. The "senior" hit the newcomer on the chest four times; the latter fell down and never got up. He died for a piece of bread!

Similar facts of violating the regulations of statutory interpersonal relations have lately occurred in Sevastopol, Ivano-Frankivsk, and some other military garrisons. Speaking in general, we should state with alarm that in January-February the rate of this crime has increased by 14 percent in all of Ukraine's military formations, and by 37 percent in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

There is another alarming trend: The suicide rate in the Army is increasing. In 1993, 123 servicemen killed themselves. Over the first two months of 1994, there were 24 such cases. The number of cases of draft-dodging has also grown—desertion, going AWOL, and so on. Last year, more than 3,000 such crimes were committed. This year, there have been 400 of them. Almost 2,000 violators are still on the run. While hiding, they exacerbate criminal situations and often commit heinous crimes. Last year, 414 such cases were disclosed.

Unfortunately, thefts of arms and military property have become more commonplace in the Army. Not long ago, 15 Kalashnikov assault rifles and 15 Makarov pistols were stolen from one of the units in the Kharkiv garrison. Six assault rifles and a machine gun with ammunition have been stolen from a coast guard unit in Yevpatoriya.

It is startling that the storage of weapons and property is not organized in an appropriate manner. Last year, losses caused by mismanagement, embezzlements, and thefts cost the state a fortune—70 billion karbovantsi. This sum includes the 65 billion caused by the disappearance of fuel and lubricants. Gasoline, kerosene, lubricants, and diesel fuel are pumped into Army reservoirs, and only God knows where they vanish.

We have lately observed the alarming phenomenon of Mafia elements penetrating into the Army circles. Some time ago, profiteers in uniforms were booked in one of the units in the Odessa military district. Those were military financiers who had made agreements with local dealers and used Army assets—hundreds of millions karbovantsi—for trading. Here is another example: In July 1993, the Defense Ministry Directorate for Material Supplies signed an agreement with a small commercial

enterprise for the shipping of undershirts and transferred 5.6 billion karbovantsi to the dealers. Soldiers never saw the undershirts, while the smart dealers paid back the money five months later, this time significantly devaluated.

[Cherkas] Regarding this, let me ask you a hackneyed question: What is the prosecutor doing? At the session that you have just conducted, military prosecutors maintained that they would not be able to continue work under the current circumstances.

[Melnik] Their stories are absolutely true. The point is that the former chiefs of Ukraine's General Prosecutor's Office virtually destroyed the existing system of military prosecution, claiming that the Army did not need it. Although genuine legal experts opposed this, their voices were ignored. For example, General Major of Legal Service V. Melnychuk, military prosecutor of the Western region, appealed to various state institutions but nobody paid any attention. As a result of this, the most experienced military lawyers abandoned the Army for other legal bodies. We found ourselves, so to say, back where we started. Although the military prosecutor's service has been legalized again, it is to be comprised of 484 specialists, while as of today, we have only 300. Eighty eight of these people are investigators, charged with the following primary tasks: Supervision over the observance of Ukrainian laws by bodies of command, military formations, combined units, units, and subunits, establishments, and military educational institutions, the officials of the Armed Forces, the Border Troops, the National Guard, the Department of State Protection, the Security Service, and other military formations in Ukraine. Can you imagine the scope of their responsibilities? The monthly workload of a military investigator is five times the volume of the workload of a territorial [civil] investigator. And you are asking what military prosecutors are doing. From morning until evening, and often at night these people hardly have time to breathe. Getting to the venue to carry out an investigation is another problem, because there is either no car or no gasoline. Military lawyers continuously apply for termination of Army service. We have no one to replace these people—there is not a single educational institution in Ukraine training specialists for military prosecution.

Still, even under these conditions people work and persistently uphold legality and order in the young Army of sovereign Ukraine. In 1993, 36 percent more criminal cases were investigated and sent to courts than in 1992. Purposeful preventive activities are being carried out in the Army. Taking advantage of the occasion, I want to address servicemen's parents by means of the Supreme Council newspaper [HOLOS UKRAYINY]: The military prosecutor's service will do everything in its power to ensure their sons' legal protection. At the same time, I appeal to all the employees of military prosecutor offices to step up legal supervision in every way regardless of the current tough situation, to firmly keep watch over the protection of our state laws.

[Cherkas] You should agree that our conversation with Ukraine's deputy general prosecutor was not very optimistic. The cited facts from servicemen's lives portray a miserable picture. I am reading the HOLOS UKRAYINY article "Scene of Crime—Barracks" dealing with the same issues. Perhaps, the writer of the article did not look into the current situation of the military prosecution attentively enough and his criticism of the "bureaucrats in prosecutor chairs" is not quite balanced. As it appears from the cited facts, military lawyers do not twiddle their thumbs. The criminal situation in the troops is indeed horrendous. In my opinion, prosecutorial supervision alone is not enough. Apparently the education and sociopsychological services of the Defense Ministry and other military formations fall short of their task. We probably need distinctly coordinated activities of the chiefs of all the military services to curb the reign of the violators of the law; and to persistently ensure the triumph of the military statutes and the military oath. The president of Ukraine, who is commander in chief of the Armed Forces should also put in his weighty word in this regard. Crimes are crimes also in the Army.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Abkhazians Seize Strategic Point Of Lata

94UM0331 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Mar 94 p 3

[Article by Pyotr Karapetyan: "Heavy Fighting at Kodori Canyon In Sixth Day, Abkhaz Detachments Take Control of Strategic Points"]

[Text] In all the conflicting reports coming out of Tbilisi and Sukhumi, one thing is beyond doubt: On March 25, after several months of relative peace, the first shots rang out in the Kodori canyon in the border region.

Blood is being spilled, and people are dying. There are dead and wounded among the civilians of the villages of Khucha, Kvemo, and Lata, and Ganakhleba has been destroyed almost completely. According to official

sources, local battles are under way in Zugdidi Rayon in Western Georgia. The Abkhazians have taken control of the strategically important village of Lata. The Georgian authorities are hurriedly evacuating the population of Svanetia and villages adjacent to the Kodori canyon.

Unfortunately, those who predicted a new escalation of the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation in spring have been proved correct. It is by no means accidental that the new round of fighting began in the Kodori canyon.

In terms of its importance to the Abkhazians, it can be compared to the Lachinsk corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is a "humanitarian path" at Kodori, and helicopters delivering cargo from the republics of the North Caucasus to Abkhazia fly over the Kodori canyon. Significantly, their flight paths are out of range of air defense systems. The Georgians will naturally do everything in their power to block that corridor; by the same token, it is clear that the Abkhazians will fight for it to the last man. The forces that have been committed—artillery, Grad launchers, and helicopter gunships—attest to the seriousness of both sides' intentions. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has learned that the Abkhazians have moved a regiment into the Kodori canyon and the adjacent area. The Georgians are opposing it with two divisions, not from the regular army but from the militarized Mkhedrioni detachments.

In this situation, the politicians can only concede that the opportunity to activate a peaceful mechanism to settle the conflict has been missed. Eduard Shevardnadze has said that recent events in Abkhazia make it perfectly clear that the Gudauta leadership has nothing but disdain for the peacemaking efforts of the UN and Russia. The counterattack on Sukhumi didn't end anything either. People there remember the Georgian parliament's well-known decision to disband the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, automatically liquidating the Abkhaz delegation at the Geneva talks as a legal entity. As a result, the talks that had been set up with such difficulty were torpedoed.

The sides continue to claim that dialogue is still possible. But at the same time, to all appearances, they are preparing for a different course of events.

ARMS TRADE

Prospects for Defense Sales in Asia

94UM0335A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Nikolay Yevsenkin under the rubric "At the Crossroads of Trade": "Eldorado" in Asia"]

[Text] The nations of Southeast Asia, the Pacific Rim, are called the new "Golden Eldorado" today. Travelling businessmen of all the world's military companies of any significance are frequent visitors to government offices and headquarters at the very highest levels located in the capitals of the Asian states. These are the nations which are increasingly becoming the managers and organizers of prestigious military exhibits and shows. What the world press refers to as the "next great arms race" is being played out there.

According to many Western experts, the market in weapons of the Pacific Rim is becoming the most promising. Its potential economic volume reaches the astronomical amount of 100 billion dollars.

In order to understand the next (this time "Asian") miracle, one has to turn to both foreign and domestic factors. The former group embraces the process of forced economic growth of the Pacific Rim countries. Suffice it to say that in recent decades the combined gross national product (GNP) of China and Japan, and the so-called "little tigers"—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, newly industrialized countries (NIC)—has grown by 160 percent, reaching 4 trillion dollars. The military budget of the vast majority of Asian nations is growing annually, most of which goes for the purchase of weapons abroad.

The foreign factors are interregional conflicts pertaining to the unresolved status of territorial disputes, the struggle for leadership in the region (the traditional rivalry between China and Japan, for example). All of this creates a qualitatively new situation in the world market of military exports, where a very fierce battle is underway for dominance of the gold-generating Asian niche—the absolute leader is the USA, with Western Europe and Russia attempting not to fall behind.

The entire belt of Pacific Rim countries can be hypothetically broken down into three subgroups with certain common patterns of development of their armed forces and military imports. The first includes the countries in the northern part of the region—China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas—which have a developed military industrial base and diversified military trade ties.

The most impressive is China's project for establishing an airborne assault grouping in the South China Sea, which would permit Beijing to establish domination in the body of water of the "inner China Sea." According to experts, this would cost China 4-6 billion dollars. A

component of this plan is the purchase of supersonic Tu-22M bombers from Russia.

Japan's military budget reached 34 billion dollars this year. The American military-industrial complex, the strategic rival in the region and main supplier for Tokyo, is in strategic competition with Continental China. This is how one Japanese diplomat puts it: "If China actually purchases an aircraft carrier, we shall have to reconsider the strategy of the entire region."

The second group of countries (which, incidentally, actively import foreign weapons) includes the states of the southern part of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. At the end of the 1980's the leaders of most of these countries adopted large-scale programs for modernizing their armed forces. The government of the Philippines, for example, approved a 10-year plan for the development of its army at an estimated cost of five billion dollars.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore have set themselves the task of establishing a "deep-water" navy by the end of the century; that is, forces capable of conducting operations in the open ocean, not just in coastal waters. Within the framework of these programs purchases of surface ships are being planned and implemented, their own rapid-deployment forces are being formed, formations of long-range fighter bombers are being formed capable of supporting the operations of naval task forces.

It should be mentioned that the fiercest competition for weapons sales among the exporting nations is developing precisely in these countries today. Washington is the unquestionable leader, but Russia also has a fairly good chance. According to the LOS ANGELES TIMES, Russia has something to take to this market. And the importing countries are taking the initiative. In June 1993 Malaysia's leadership announced its intention to purchase 18 MIG-29 aircraft. Thailand's military leadership is considering the purchase of transport helicopters.

The third group of countries includes the nations of post-communist Indochina. Due to their economic difficulties the leaders of these countries are a long way from buying modern armaments at the present time. Nonetheless, one should not forget that the 700,000-man Vietnamese army is outfitted mostly with our equipment and weapons.

The Soviet naval base established in 1978 at the port of Kamrahn is an advantageous project for Hanoi today. It could become a stable source of foreign currency. Russia is the most likely competitor here, since in July 1992 Vietnam's leadership expressed its agreement with Moscow's intention to retain this naval base.

And so, a boom in military purchases in the Pacific Rim countries is in the offing. Overall outlays on military imports have increased there from 2.5 billion (1979-1981) to 4.6 billion (1987-1989) dollars, an increase of

84 percent. Russia's military-industrial complex, which has some indisputable aces to play (including comparatively low prices, as well as the possibility of barter agreements) has a perfectly realistic chance for the future development of this market.

Weapons Spares Deal With India Welcomed

PM2004104494 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Apr 94 First Edition p 6

[Nikolay Paklin report specially for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA: "Bypassing Rivals. Indo-Russian Contracts To Total \$100 Million"]

[Text] Delhi—The shortfall in deliveries of spares from Russia for weapons which India bought from the former Soviet Union has become the talk of the country. This issue has been raised literally at every level up to and including the Russo-Indian summit. Our former government found itself strangely unable to resolve an issue that was not so difficult. But things have now gotten moving—a package of long-awaited contracts on shipments of spares has been signed in Delhi. It is mainly a question of meeting the needs of the Indian Air Force, not least its naval aviation.

"Yet another package of similar contracts will soon be signed," Stanislav Filin, deputy general director of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, who headed the Russian delegation at the first round of the Delhi talks, said. "These will stipulate shipments of spares for the ground forces. The total value of the contracts will be approximately \$100 million. The spares issue will thereby mainly be removed from the agenda...."

But the main result of the Delhi talks, in S. Filin's opinion, is that Russia and India have agreed on a program for further cooperation in the military sphere that takes account of the sides' long-term interests. There has been a great deal of speculation in India about the modernization of our MiG-21 fighters. There are several hundred of these aircraft in service with the Indian Air Force. Indian pilots rate their performance highly. But over the past few years the MiG-21 has become obsolete. Russia has stopped producing them. Hence the problem with spare shipments. India came up with the idea of not writing off these aircraft but modernizing them. A few years ago the Indians appealed to us to draw up a modernization program. The Mikoyan design bureau carried out the order. Corresponding proposals were put to India. But Delhi's reply was delayed. Exploiting this uncertainty, some former Warsaw Pact states put their own proposals to India for the modernization of the Russian fighters. Recently Israel has been particularly importunate in offering its services. Israeli delegations have descended on Delhi one after another. Their arguments have boiled down to saying that many former Soviet aircraft engineers have now emigrated to Israel to work, and they will have no difficulty in modernizing the MiG-21.

But ultimately India preferred its traditional partner—Russia. Any other decision would have looked strange: It was Russia that gave birth to the large MiG family, and

even the collapse of the Soviet Union has not adversely affected their production—after all, the leading enterprises producing the MiG's and components for them are located within the Russian Federation.

The modernization of the MiG-21 will be substantially advantageous for India—its combat might will be increased at least 2.5 times for a relatively small outlay. Winning this major order will also be a "shot in the arm" for our aircraft plants, which are going through hard times.

Accord was also reached at the Delhi talks on the acquisition by India of a new batch of modern MiG-29's. A figure of 30 aircraft is being mentioned. Justifying their purchase, the Indian side is drawing attention to the increased combat might of the Pakistani Air Force. India is particularly concerned about the possibility of several dozen U.S. F-16 aircraft being supplied to Pakistan, with which it has a strained relationship.

But not all of the package of proposals which the Russian delegation brought to the Indian capital was agreed. India's acquisition of certain types of Russian military hardware was postponed. These include the unique "Tunguska" air defense system. On the other hand, another avenue in Russo-Indian cooperation is opening up—the leasing of our weapons systems to the Indian Army. We agreed that the Indian side could try our weapons in its country before making its final choice. Admittedly, India will have to pay for the pleasure of seeing our latest weapons in action. Military specialists are particularly interested in large-caliber Russian guns. The Indian Army would like to take a three- to five-year lease on some 152-mm self-propelled howitzers. They plan to use them as the basis for manufacturing their own 155-mm artillery pieces under Russian license in line with the standard used in the Indian Army. The gun could be given a "self-propelled" capacity by a mount developed on the basis of the T-72 M1 tank.

Our new helicopters will substantially strengthen India's defense potential. They are designed for antitank warfare. We will also be supplying air-defense systems to the Indian Navy.

It seems as though the hiatus in Russo-Indian military cooperation has been overcome. But it should be remembered that a fierce competitive battle is under way for the large Indian arms market—the Indian Army is the fourth largest in the world. Britain is persistently offering India its military helicopters. The British premier is acting as "fixer." France, which has already supplied Mirages, is after more aircraft orders. Italy and the United States have not lost hope of selling their military aircraft equipment to India. Western arms suppliers are offering the Indian Army tanks, artillery systems, and other weapons, while offering the Navy their old ships as well as new vessels. A winding-down of Russian military shipments to India—something which had begun to occur—would merely have played into our competitors' hands. Issues like this are not resolved unilaterally. Russia cannot afford to suffer economic, moral, and political damage for the sake of abstract principles.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Value of Civilian Products from Defense Industries

94UM0358B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian No 47 (471), 17 Mar 94 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Statistics"]

[Text] More than 80 percent of the products from defense industries today are for civilian purposes: agricultural equipment, equipment for light, food, and chemical industry, machine tools and motor vehicle trailers, household radio equipment and televisions, gas and electric ranges, vacuum cleaners, bicycles, furniture, small summer houses, street cars, medical equipment, diesel generators, motor vehicles...

In 1993, the military-industrial complex produced the following:

- 520,000 kW of steam turbines;
- 20.044 billion rubles [R] worth of oilfield and drilling equipment and spare parts for it;
- nearly R10 billion worth of equipment for manufacturing knitted fabric;
- 7,748 woodworking machines;
- 3,587,500 televisions;
- 212,000 knitting machines;
- 3,261,200 refrigerators and freezers;
- 188,700 motor blocks;
- R31.928 billion worth of automobile spare parts;
- R1.0163 billion worth of medicines;
- R33.933 billion worth of sporting equipment;
- 3,844,000 pairs of shoes.

At the same time, in those areas where it is necessary to maintain expensive fixed assets, a sharp decrease in production volumes is observed: 42 percent in the arms industry; 40.2 percent in the shipbuilding industry; and 29.9 percent in the electronics industry.

A particularly difficult situation has taken shape in the electronics industry, where the volume of production has decreased to the 1991 level to 67 percent, including to 35 percent for military products and to 81.6 percent for consumer goods. Computer equipment production last year was 32 percent less than in 1992.

The 1993 budget level did not make it possible to compensate for the increase in cost of maintaining fixed assets of equipment, which are the basis of high technologies, and led to a decrease in the share of funds allocated for wages. As a result, the average monthly wage in the defense complex in 1993 was R28,600 with the statistical average for Russia at R58,400.

The draft 1994 budget allocated approximately 46 percent of the 1993 level of funds for national defense needs. In the next 3-4 months, this may deprive about 20 million people of means of existence.

Medical Equipment from Defense Plants

94UM0358C Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian No 47 (471), 17 Mar 94 p 11

[Unattributed article: "'Varyag' Has Converted to Knives"]

[Text] As a result of conversion, giants of the Far East's military-industrial complex, "Varyag", "Dalpribor", "Askol", and "Radiopribor", have begun producing top-rate medical equipment, which was on exhibit at the "Medical Equipment in the Maritime Area" symposium exhibition held in Vladivostok.

For four days, representatives of medical institutions of the kray familiarized themselves with the latest types of medical equipment. In a demonstration hall of the Primorye trade building there were 62 types of series-produced medical equipment on presented.

Scientists of the Far East have supplied plants with the latest medical instrument technologies. Of special interest were unique developments of micro-surgical knives for performing eye operations. They were created by the private enterprise "Dalyus." According to specialists, there is nothing like this high-precision equipment in the world.

Defense Leaders on Impact of 1994 Defense Budget Cuts

94UM0333A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Yegorov: "Financial Squeeze for Industrialists, Scientists, and VUZ Teachers Training Cadres for the Defense Sector"]

[Text] As is known, the 1994 draft budget calls for significant cuts in defense expenditures in comparison with last year: For maintenance of the Army by practically half, for research and development by a factor of 2.3, for arms purchases by a factor of 5.5. Conversion programs approved by the government for 1993-1994 are being rolled back since credit resources have been provided only for the first quarter of this year. Besides this, we are not meeting the requirements of the Order of the President of Russia of 6 November 1993 "On Stabilization of the Economic Situation of Enterprises and Organizations of the Defense Industry and Measures to Support State Defense Orders" having to do with development of weapons programs for the period up to the year 2000, establishment of conditions "for stable functioning of defense enterprises in the market economy," financing of conversion and wages in the amount of eight minimal monthly payments.

The adoption of the state budget for 1994 in the form which is proposed by the government thus means complete stoppage of the majority of 3,000 scientific-research institutes [NII], design bureaus [KB] and plants, and discharge

of a minimum of 6 million persons directly employed in [filling] military orders from the sphere of material production.

Counting the enterprises which form whole cities and where no other work exists, the number of those suffering from the cuts may exceed 15 million persons. Areas of concentration of the defense industry in Moscow and the Moscow oblast (1.5 million persons), Udmurtiya, the Urals, central Russia, the Northwest, Novosibirsk, and Omsk will suffer especially greatly. But it is not only a matter of social consequences. The country is being stripped of its basic industrial and scientific potential. It is a matter of national security, the future of Russia and its people. This is how the directors of defense enterprises, trade union leaders, and scientists assess the present situation.

It is not hard to predict the negative consequences of stoppage of the defense complex. The cost of civilian goods will skyrocket. Export of arms will halt completely, since the "finishing" enterprises will not be able to close the technological circuits of cooperation. Already experiencing a shortage of up-to-date systems and equipment, the Army will be disarmed without international treaties and agreements. The old weapons grow decrepit, and new ones are not being developed or purchased.

What are we to do in this situation? In the opinion of the industrialists, prominent scientists, and VUZ teachers preparing cadres for the enterprises of the military industrial complex, we absolutely must raise appropriations. By a factor of two at a minimum. But on the other hand, this is a hard thing to do under present conditions, for the weight of military expenditures in the general budget is already excessive. What, then, is the way out?

Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, believes it lies in immediate resolution of a group of problems. In particular, he believes, we must approve the expenditure portion of the state budget for the first quarter of 1994 in the amount of expenditures of the fourth quarter of 1993, no less. And by indexing that, provide industry with the means of existence in the coming months, while there is no annual budget. Then we must improve the tax legislation of Russia. Today it does not stimulate production or enhance the investment activity of enterprises. For one ruble of commodity production, says A. Shulunov, we pay taxes of up to 90 kopecks.

It is easy to see that the growth in state extortion, dictated by the desire to compensate for the cut in income due to the sharp drop in volume of production, in turn prompts the producer to conceal income. Just according to official data, last year the government failed to collect 7.5 trillion rubles for this reason. This is more than all military expenditures put together. The chairman of the Customs Committee states officially that budget losses due to failure to pay taxes from foreign economic activity amount to 10 billion dollars. And if

monies of the shadow economy, which also circulate outside the sphere of tax control, are included in this sum (according to some data they amount to three times the annual budget), it is easy to see that the income portion of the budget for 1993 has been reduced by a factor of three. If this had not occurred, industry not only would avoid the "card file," but would also have earned money for investment.

The industrialists and scientists unanimously demand an immediate change in the existing order of military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries, and for elimination of all obstacles in the path of independent export of arms and military equipment by defense enterprises through state licence. In the words of Shulunov, just the restoration of old commercial ties, resuscitating the export of ZIP [spare parts, tools, and instrument kits], and modernization and servicing of equipment sold in the past will bring in up to 4 billion dollars annually to the complex.

Director of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute [TsAGI] Academician German Zagaynov says that today we still have in fact a system of weapons sales by the state. And this is a symptom of a totalitarian regime. He also names another possible way out from this situation—to move from talking about selective support and structural *perestroika* of industry and science to actually doing something. Now instead of selective support, there is dilution of resources at the level of the department apparatus. Says the Academician, it is time for the state to decide whom it intends to support through the budget, and to what extent. For with the present orders of 3 to 5 planes a year for a plant with a capacity of 200, everything will become pointless. The same applies to the scientific research institutes and design bureaus: often they duplicate one another. For this reason, state orders must be concentrated after determining the executors on the basis of expert assessment. As for those who are left without orders, give them their freedom. Freedom to privatize, selecting the optimal type of activity.

I need to make a qualification here. The directors of enterprises and officials of trade unions, while unconditionally supporting the idea itself of going public, at the same time sharply protest voucher privatization of their enterprises. And in general this is understandable. Through the sale of stock they could obtain sizeable resources to resume production. But for now the profit from privatization of state property (in 1993) amounts to 169 billion rubles. This sum scarcely sufficed for conduct of check auctions and advertising. Aleksey Shulunov states bluntly that we must halt checkbook privatization while the complex still has things of value.

In the opinion of German Zagaynov, today we cannot "cage up" even those enterprises which remain "purely state enterprises." It is reasonable to change a number of them into technical pools and holding companies, where the part which is national property would remain state property and would be maintained out of the budget; and the rest, which grew up for service support and impart to

the enterprise the nature of a subsistence economy, would serve as the basis for the holding company. A system of daughter enterprises would allow the transformation of high defense technologies into technologies of civilian branches of industry. The director of TsAGI believes that we can no longer put off the formation of large industrial-finance corporations and the merger of design bureaus and serial plants into a single technological and commercial structure. Otherwise we will lose not world markets, but our own, and will be deprived of the design bureaus and plants.

But then, we have already lost practically a third of the numerical strength of the defense complex. Clever and knowledgeable specialists have left science and design bureaus, so that the average age of the associates of scientific research institutes and design bureaus has increased sharply. There is practically no worthy replacement for the designers and engineers owing to the complete absence of so-called cadre accompaniment of the programs being developed in the state. The opinion is growing that the authors are writing them for themselves, eternal and ageless.

The Rector of Moscow State Technical University [MGU] imeni N.E. Bauman, Professor Igor Fedorov, who lately has spoken often at various types of conferences, strives to call attention to the disastrous plight of his university, and also of other major technical VUZ of the country, the Moscow Aviation Institute [MAI], and the Tula and Chelyabinsk Technical Universities, but finds sympathy only from colleagues. In recent months the state has flatly refused to finance the MGU, with the result that the university's indebtedness for utilities today amounts to 1 billion 600 million rubles. The out-of-town academic and experimental complex at Dmitrov, which for around 20 years has been developed through the efforts of enterprises of the defense and space complex, has been frozen. And today practically the main concern of the rector of this VUZ, which graduated Korolev, Tupolev, Shukhov, Barmin, and Pilyugin, is to clarify relations with *Mosenergo* [Moscow Electric Company], which intends to disconnect the electrical power from the university.

In other countries this is called a shame; in ours it is called difficulties of the transitional period.

In his letter to the editors, the director of TsAGI Academician G. Zagaynov analyzes the situation and the ways of emerging from it: "Today it is hard for everyone, but for all the variety of state tasks and interests, we must nonetheless single out one and give it the status of most important—assuring a worthy standard of living for Russians. Really, it is the only task whose start will require that we begin to speak of morality, of culture, and of national security. The relationship is clear: There is a high living standard in those countries where there is high technology in the basic branches of the economy—machine-building, transport, power engineering,

raw-materials and processing branches, agriculture, communications, construction, and the service sphere.

Thus it has developed that in Russia, in these civilian branches of the economy, the technological level is far from the world level. High technologies have been preserved only in the defense complex, and primarily in the aerospace complex. For this reason, technical refitting of the basic branches of the economy, with participation of the defense complex of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the higher school, should be considered the national task of first priority.

That is why the government must listen to the defense industry leaders first of all. Especially since not so much is required of it. It must use its influence to promote the union of defense industry leaders and civilian branches, not oppose the purchase of foreign technologies, and guarantee investments. In other words, the industrialists, scientists, and trade unions of the defense branches once again are offering themselves as allies to the government. And this is not a return to the older system of socialist planning. Basically, it is a market economy with directed influence of the state. This is how national tasks have been and continue to be accomplished throughout the world.

Military Producers Face Uphill Battles

*PM1404154994 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 94 p 6*

[Sergey Zavorotnyy, Igor Chernyak article: "Will Pinochet Save the Russian Military-Industrial Complex?"]

[Excerpts] In February through March, Russian aircraft led by the new IL-96 air-dropped powerful assault forces from the military-industrial complex at two opposite points on the earth's globe: first in Singapore, then in Chile. The aim: participation in the "ASIA-94" and "FIDAE-94" aerospace shows, on which between \$1 and \$1.5 million was spent. [passage omitted]

"We go to all these exhibition with hope. Nowadays, we are prepared to sell licenses, test methods, and know-how—this could secure a living for ourselves and affiliated plants for some time at least," Academician Anatoliy Obukhov, chief designer at the "Bazalt" Science and Production Association, the Russian Federation's largest producer of mines, munitions, aircraft bombs, and grenade launchers, explained. "Today, I no longer see any other ways for the defense complex to survive." [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] What, according to your calculations, is the safety margin for you, for munitions producers in general?

[Obukhov] A year, I think, for all of us. After a year, everything will be finished.

[Correspondent] But is this really such a terrible thing? There are many countries without these types of munitions plants, and they manage....

[Obukhov] Let's begin from the premise that cartridges, projectiles, and aircraft weapons are still needed—without them, the Army and Navy, even in peaceful conditions, simply cannot exist, not to mention the fact that the number of localized conflicts in the world is not decreasing. Did anybody bother to calculate how much it would cost to purchase all this abroad for our Armed Forces before destroying our own munitions sector? I can merely assume that nobody is going to sell us anything on the cheap, and that they are unlikely to make the latest models available for purchase. On top of all that, we are in this instance providing jobs not at home but abroad, and what is more we are falling into direct dependency on suppliers (and it is vital to be 100-percent sure of such alliances). But, in general, it has long been time to clarify our position: Either we consent to the role of being the West's raw materials appendage with all that ensues from this, or we strive to preserve and develop our own technologies. [Obukhov ends]

And there is another factor which has been voiced in one form or another in many conversations. Whether Russia likes it or not, its place on the armaments market may very soon, and without any particular hue and cry, be taken by its powerful southeastern neighbor. Having saturated the world with cheap rugs, clothes, children's toys, and other consumer goods, and having earned on the strength of this around \$100 billion last year alone, it, according to expert testimony, will calmly undertake to buy up military technologies. A small proportion has already been acquired from the Russian military-industrial complex. The possible consequences of this require special discussion, but defense workers are growing increasingly certain that the Chinese have the power to swamp the markets with cheap weaponry and military hardware.

In America's Backyard

What, then, was the outcome of Russia's participation in the Singapore and Chile exhibitions? There is no simple answer. After all, aircraft, like weapons, are not snapped up in a couple of days. [passage omitted]

In Santiago, we happened to strike up a conversation with two "defense workers" who had come here with the "Tor-M1" and "Tunguska" complexes—the pride of the Russian military-industrial complex.

"We displayed the 'Tor-M1' in Abu-Dhabi, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Greece, and now we have come to Chile. There is enormous interest everywhere," Valentin Osilov, deputy chief designer of the "Antey" Concern, explained.

[Correspondent] How many items were sold in this time, and to whom?

[Osilov] So far, not a single item. [Osilov ends]

The picture is the same for the "Tunguska," the only sample of which made its way secretly to one of the NATO countries. Likewise, no customers can be seen waiting in line for the vast majority of other military-industrial complex products either. Yes, of course, everyone is in raptures, the front pages of the newspapers are littered with huge headlines like "Russians Again Conquer the World!" but the problem is how to turn this into business....

Red-Brown Bill?

Revenue from the sale of weaponry from the USSR, and subsequently from Russia, fell from \$20 billion in the 1980's to \$1.9 [billion] in 1993. Much has been written about the reasons for this—these include the general warming up of the situation in the world, the loss of major "clients" like Iraq or Libya, the instability of the situation in Russia, and erratic after-sales service, not to mention poor advertising. Would not, therefore, Russia be better off completely renouncing such persistent presentation of its aircraft, weaponry, and hardware abroad?

This would hardly be sensible—everybody we managed to speak with was agreed on this. If only because nobody in the whole world disputes the competitiveness of Russian products. Yes, it is necessary to advertise them more effectively; yes, it is vital to seek out new contacts, to convince people of the superiority of our goods, to search for mutually acceptable options, and ultimately to win over potential partners—indeed, can we survive without this? There are enough experts in the Russian Federation with a highly developed knowledge of such sensitive matters—including in the recently created "Rosvooruzheniye" State Committee, the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and "Aviaekspert." But, even if they were magicians, their efforts would be worthless without powerful political support.

The following is a trite example: When the United States heard about the preparations underway for Russia to sell Malaysia a batch of MIG aircraft, American senators and military experts flocked to Kuala Lumpur, and even the U.S. President's personal representative gave the Malaysians the honor of a visit. A mass of options was offered, right up to a significant price cut—if only they would take the F-16 instead. As a result, the Americans "shoved in" their own machines, while Russian representatives have spent over a year fighting to settle the details of their contract. The managers of a number of U.S. firms concerned by Russia's attempt to display its wares in Singapore in the appropriate way also appealed to the White House for help. And, typically, the President did not label them "fascists" or take them to task for trying to become a burden around the neck of the American people, but instructed that \$600,000 be allocated from the state budget to cover their expenses at the

Singapore airshow. (It is hardly a coincidence that the Americans were given the lion's share of the time to demonstrate their hardware, and Russia as a result, to use the lively expression of our interlocutor, was frankly dumped.) Bill Clinton, like, moreover, his predecessors, is not averse, if need be, with Hillary at his side, to going to the other end of the Earth in order at odd moments to undertake the defense of their military-industrial complex. And advisers hardly need to tell him that revenue losses from the trade in weapons represent a loss of influence by the state, and the weakening of its zones of interests, or, for instance, that he who flies ultimately rules the world.

You have to have a pretty rich imagination to present Andrey Kozyrev or Boris Yeltsin in the role of defenders of the interests of the military-industrial complex.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Changes in Small Subunit Tactics

94UM0338A Moscow VOYENNOY VESTNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 1993 (Signed to press
19 Oct 93) pp 28-30

[Article by Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lecturer, Retired Colonel E. Zmachinskiy: "On Subunit Tactics"]

[Text] Today we are becoming witnesses to major changes in the international situation and in the country's domestic and foreign policies. The peace-loving course taken by Russia in recent years has practically reduced to naught the danger of the emergence of nuclear missile war. But it is perhaps premature to arrive at the conclusion that no one and nothing threatens Russian statehood. (Unfortunately, some politicians are attempting to convince people of that in the mass media). It is impossible to ignore the fact that combat operations are becoming increasingly widespread in the near abroad and also everything is not peaceful in the far abroad.

Battles of "local significance" are being conducted, as a rule, by small armed detachments and groups, and not always skillfully from the point of view of tactics. Hence the increase of unwarranted losses. Officers who have completed higher military schools and academies are leading compulsory service personnel who have completed their military obligation and on the whole well-trained guerrillas. All of this permits us to doubt to a certain extent the correctness of previously solid approaches to training people and suggests the thought on the need to examine certain views that affect the tactics of small subunits and their comprehension.

This question appears to be fundamental first of all because the result of a small subunit battle directly impacts the combat operations of a larger tactical echelon on which the course and outcome of an operation frequently depend. Furthermore, the practitioners—the

soldiers and officers, through whose hands victory is attained, first of all pay for the theorists' mistakes.

Any science is in constant development. As a component of military science (military art), tactics are also modified from time to time. What specific features in small subunit operational tactics have emerged today?

There are several of them. I will begin with the advisability, in my view, of imparting a somewhat different characterization to the opposing side. While studying tactics as an academic discipline, we perceived and perceive the enemy in the form of a specific organic structure with definite (known beforehand) personnel strength, weapons, combat tactics, standards, etc.

However, in our time, this stereotype is nothing other than harm and we cannot bear it. Armed conflicts are conducted according to other "laws". Consequently, it makes sense to present the enemy numerically. That is, based upon the number of opposing personnel and armored targets, weapons emplacements and so forth. And it is hardly worthwhile to delve into the details of the opposing side's organic structure or, say, its unit affiliation while accomplishing a training or actual combat mission on the squad, platoon or company scale. It seems to me that the main thing here is knowledge of the actual enemy and his capabilities that have been obtained based upon intelligence data.

The typical diversity of the enemy and therefore, the unpredictability of his operations, increases the role of the latter. We can encounter a completely unfamiliar structure and even its absence (as it occurred in Afghanistan) instead of theoretically known enemy formations in one-on-one combat with spontaneously created detachments and groups.

Formerly, subunit combat capabilities were examined in detail when studying their tactics. Now, I think, we need to pay attention to combat requirements on a par with them. What does that signify? First of all the need to establish the number of targets that are subject to destruction to attain success in battle. For example, on an offensive—100% of the weapons that are preventing us from seizing the target of the attack. On defense—no less than 50% of the attackers' personnel and weapons.

As for the combat missions (their parameters) and forming up, obviously, the time has come to more precisely define certain provisions of the Field Manual. By way of illustration, the currently legitimized method of forming up the defending troops with the presence of large gaps in them causes bewilderment. You won't manage to reliably cover gaps between subunits at night, under conditions of poor visibility, and in a number of cases during the day. A battle most often carries over onto broken terrain and soldiers and weapons are located in trenches, that is, practically on the surface of the earth. Details of the relief, vegetation, ground features, dust and smoke substantially impede surveillance and the conduct of aimed fire. As events in the Persian Gulf demonstrated, it is already impossible to consider

various types of impediments to be impenetrable barriers. In my opinion, subunits that are operating according to today's standards are doomed to defeat from the beginning.

How should we act? We most likely need to return to the experience of the concluding stage of the Great Patriotic War. The standards that were applied at that time appeared as a result of painstaking analysis of a multitude of previous battles and engagements. We can say that they became the essence of the maturity of our tactics and ultimately were one of the main factors in the attainment of victory over the enemy. It is probably no accident that the leading war colleges of the entire world have been intently studying the experience of those years until now.

A few words about the motorized rifle squad. In the existing organic structure, it is actually incapable of operating in a combat situation with adequate effectiveness. The fact is that we cannot even think about similar formations that previously existed and that currently exist in a number of foreign armies without hand-to-hand combat. Practically no one in a motorized rifle squad participates in it. A driver (driver-mechanic), machinegunner (loader-operator), machinegunner, sniper, and an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] man with an assistant are here in secondary and even tertiary roles and are hardly capable of affecting its outcome. Moreover, in the war years it was thought that you needed to have no less than 10 men in the squad line for a successful attack on a front of up to 50 meters.

How does the author of these lines see a modern squad? A commander, 10 riflemen with automatic weapons (of them one—is the assistant RPG man and, possibly, one is the combat vehicle commander, a machinegunner, an RPG man, a sniper, machinegunners (loader-operators), and drivers (driver-mechanics). A total of 18 men and two armored vehicles. In this case, a team of fire support riflemen is drawn in great detail which is extremely important in cases of limited capabilities of artillery and aircraft, and also without joint participation of a tank subunit with the motorized riflemen in a battle. In any case, the emergence of similar situations is not excluded.

A squad of that structure is capable of defending itself on a front of 100-150 meters and up to 100 m in depth. In an offensive, the motorized riflemen can operate while located either behind the armored vehicles or ahead of them, or while having one ahead and the other with the fire support group behind the squad line. That is, the movement of BTR's [armored transport vehicles] and BMP's [armored infantry vehicles] will in some ways begin to remind you of the flight of a pair of aircraft—the flight leader and the wing man which, in my opinion, makes sense.

The subunit combat capability calculation methods proposed by the tactics training manuals also need to be made more precise. Let's take as an example the recommended number of bullets expended per meter of front

per minute. It is thought that the higher the density of fire the greater the probability of attaining victory. It would seem that everything is correct from the point of view of theory. However, in practice, infantry did not and will not conduct small arms fire against lines or areas. It fires against specifically visible live targets. And the outcome of the battle does not depend on the number of bullets expended but on the number of targets destroyed.

Meanwhile, it is easy to calculate combat capabilities if you actually determine the time for conducting aimed fire (while taking into account the training of personnel). So, in the defense—from the moment of the appearance of targets until their closure with the forward edge of the battle area and the transition to a hand-to-hand skirmish.

Average weapons combat capability coefficients were also not presented in the best manner. For example, they total 0.3-0.4 for an RPG [rocket propelled grenade]. This question is appropriate: Is it true that a tank will not be hit until they assemble 3-4 RPG men together in a subunit? Where do these numbers come from? Perhaps they result from the calculation of the overall combat capabilities of the weapons that are taking part in a battle. And if they don't cause any doubts on one structural level (in a division or regiment), then they don't appear to be very well substantiated on another (in a squad, platoon or company). Here I would say we need another, weightier approach.

How are coefficients that are interpreted so unambiguously dangerous? First of all by the reduction of soldiers' confidence in their weapons. Military school graduates in the troops transfer their knowledge to their subordinates who in turn are justified in arriving at the conclusion on the inadequate effectiveness of the weapons assigned to them. Therefore, we need to provide the appropriate explanations when we discuss subunit combat capabilities.

I also have to say something about the Ground Forces Field Manual. It was never as large as it is today. The current edition contains many repetitions, some articles and attachments are excessively detailed, and certain inconsistencies are observed with the combat operations regulations of the branches of the armed forces and on the types of combat support, and with other guiding documents. I think that only the primary provisions should be set forth in it and it is better to provide for all the rest in training manuals and regulations. Furthermore, we must simplify the work of commanders of small subunits to the maximum extent possible, reducing their activities to command and control of subordinates in battle to short commands and signals. For example, in an offensive: "Platoon (squad), attack up to some landmark—FORWARD". In the defense: "Platoon (squad), to some line or other—ACTION." Of course, personnel must be well trained and know their duties in battle.

In conclusion, I will point out that, having set forth my personal point of view, I do not lay claim to the truth in the highest instance. However, I consider it necessary to sometimes examine the established canons of military art from a critical angle. Tactics will only gain from that.

COPYRIGHT: VOYENNNY VESTNIK No 12 1993

Maj-Gen Vorobyev: 'Non-Stereotypical Tactics'

94UM0330A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Major-General Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyev under "Army and Society" rubric: "War Without a Front or Rear or Several Lessons in 'Non-stereotypical' Tactics"]

[Text] The Russian Army is living through a complex period. There are a great many problems that are distracting military people from their professional business. They are nevertheless trying not to lose their professionalism. Despite everything, combat and operational training is continuing in the forces and they are engaged in their studies and command post and operational exercises.... The letters to the editor are symptomatic: Again we are seeing letters from officers requesting that we more often publish articles on the problems in the training of the forces and on current trends in the development of operational art and tactics.

In responding to these requests, we are publishing an article by Major-General of the Reserves Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyev. He is a doctor of military sciences, a professor, and a meritorious scientist of the Russian Federation. He was born in Tambov Oblast in 1922. He served in the Soviet Army from 1940 until 1987. In the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, and a rifle battalion. He worked for a long time in the administration of the Ministry of Defense. He has a number of scientific works on the problems of operational art and tactics.

Current Problems in Military Science

In reading the second part of the title, someone will probably ask: Is it really necessary to subdivide tactics into various versions? He would say that tactics, as the art of waging war, must be "universal" and "comprehensive" and must guarantee the successful training and actions of the forces under all circumstances.

Yes, that is what the theory teaches. But life, as we know, is richer. Examples? To bring the forces of the 40th Army that fought in Afghanistan up to strength, we were forced to train reinforcements in a special center. Despite the fact that the personnel selected for this were already sufficiently "broken in," it was simply necessary to retrain the people, because the "classical" tactics that they assimilated in the forces, military schools, and academies was not at all suitable for the conditions of Afghanistan. In that war, nothing happened as written in the textbooks. There was no clearly defined front and rear. The enemy could appear from anywhere and strike

at any time. Under these conditions, our forces needed "nonstandard" tactics. Unfortunately, however, it was often worked out in the course of the battle.

A no less typical example is that of the combat actions of the Americans in Vietnam. They fought there for 10 years and during all of that time they continually searched for tactical procedures that would meet the local conditions. The theater of war represented a unique "patchwork" in which the hot spots arose spontaneously in one place or another....

Unfortunately, it happened that essentially the experience of neither the Vietnam nor the Afghan nor other local wars was in demand by Soviet military art. It was considered random and untypical; thus for a long time was not used in the training of the forces. It is now time to correct this unfortunate mistake. There will likely be a place in the new field manuals for positions affecting the actions of the forces not only under the conditions of a large-scale war but also under the conditions of armed conflicts. By the way, this flows directly out of the demands of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, where it is noted that today there is an increasing danger of the rise of armed conflicts.

So, taking this into account, what actions must the forces be prepared to undertake? Above all, as was already mentioned above, the conditions of warfare in armed conflicts are extremely varied. The means of action that were worked out for a "large" war cannot be mechanically transferred to this area. In addition, the opposing sides usually have a different level of military organization, training, and technical equipment. At the same time, this does not at all mean that one must be oriented toward "simplified" tactics. Precisely local wars gave an impulse to the development of many new and rather effective means of combat operations. During the time of the Korean War, for example, the tactic of "tunnel warfare" arose and was widely used, the tactic of air mobile operations came into being in Vietnam, and the tactic of remote combat developed in the Middle East (1967, 1979, and 1982).

A special feature of local wars is that they usually become a range for the testing of new tactical concepts and kinds of military hardware. Thus, in Korea, they first used jet fighters, guided missiles of the "ship-to-air" class, helicopters, and new kinds of tanks. In Vietnam, they tested new jet bombers, supersonic fighters, artillery and missile systems, elements of the AVACS system, several kinds of aerial cluster bombs, including "Lazy Dog" bombs, the fragments (10,000) of which destroy a target over an area of 700 square meters, the "Snake Eye" bomb (weight 250 kg) equipped with an umbrella stabilizer, "Armalit" rifles that fire "tumbling" bullets, the "Vulcan" gun-machinegun with a rate of fire of 6,000-8,000 rounds per minute, "Strike" air-launched missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles. In the wars in the Middle East, they first used combat helicopters with antitank guided missiles, "Merkava" tanks, new types of aircraft and

helicopters, self-propelled artillery, tactical missiles, portable antiaircraft systems, and guided air-launched missiles. Especially intensive use was made of the means of radioelectronic warfare. The Americans carried out mass tests of combat equipment and arms during the war in the zone of the Persian Gulf: Systems of highly accurate weapons, "SLAM" and "ATAKMS" missiles, "Patriot" antiaircraft missiles, the heavy bomber GBU-15, and new models of the means of communication, radioelectronic warfare, and radio, radioengineering, and space reconnaissance.

In analyzing the experience in local wars in the 1950's through the 1990's, it is important to note that maneuvering forms of combat prevailed in them over position forms. A long positional confrontation of the sides was noted only during the time of the war in Korea. In all other wars, if such a phenomenon occurred it was only for a short time and episodic. And the possible armed conflicts of the future will hardly be an exception to this rule. Such is the tendency in the development of military science: With the increase in the power and speed of weapons and in the maneuvering capability of the forces, there is an ever greater displacement from the arsenal of tactics of such companions of positional confrontation as penetration and the use of unbroken, trench, and deeply echeloned defense. Naturally, the application of rigid methods in the operations of the forces is receding into the past and the "geometry" of the battlefield is changing fundamentally in that it is becoming "nonlinear" and "multidimensional."

Operations of forces under the conditions of an "expanded battlefield", (that is, in individual points of combat, in the absence of a clearly defined front line and direct contact of units with their neighbors and with the enemy), apparently will become new features of contemporary tactics that may be manifested especially clearly in local armed conflicts. For it is usually rather limited forces and systems that are involved in conflicts and their action is concentrated in time and space. It can be expected that the opposing side will not always strive to engage in "open" combat. More often he will prefer to avoid a direct clash with an enemy with superior numerical strength and will try to "slip away" from the strike. It must be assumed that under these conditions the basic operational methods will be surprise attacks like a "swarm of bees" against individual facilities, especially against unprotected command and control facilities, rear bases, truck convoys, guard posts and security detachments, checkpoints, and individual garrisons. It is possible that extensive use will be made of ambushes, the setting of traps, the mining of roads, and acts of terrorism. Nor can one rule out large-scale clashes that under same conditions may grow into large-scale operations.

But it appears that most characteristic for conflicts will still be frequent episodic battles. Hence, the commanders and staffs will have to make use of other methods of work in the organization and carrying out of combat operations than those that are being used, let

us say, in the penetration of a prepared defense. Those normative indicators that were developed in combat and training practice and set forth in the current field manuals are not applicable here. Most often the grouping of the "nonstandard" enemy will be quite heterogeneous. It may include the most diverse formations in terms of combat qualities. And it is impossible to assess them using generally accepted methods and operating with "averaged measures." Some units may be well armed and trained and their combat potential may conditionally be assigned the value of one. Others will be less well trained and will be more poorly equipped technically. Accordingly, the level of their combat capability will be lower.

It is also rather difficult to assess the qualitative parameters of one's own forces. What are the criteria for defining the combat possibilities of units and subunits in the waging of counter guerrilla warfare? How much force and what systems are needed to counteract ambushes, to prevent acts of sabotage, to protect and defend communications, and to carry out reconnaissance and search operations? All of these are questions that are not easily answered.

Many difficulties in making the decision to engage in combat will also arise because the commander does not by any means always see the real enemy before him. It will be very difficult to carry out reconnaissance, because the forces, as a rule, will be assigned an extensive zone of responsibility or combat operations. During the war in Afghanistan, for example, the divisions were assigned a zone of combat operations along a front of 400 to 600 km in a depth of 200 to 400 km, regiments were assigned a sector 100 to 150 km wide along the front and 50-80 km in depth, and for the battalion it was 30-40 km along the front in a depth of 15-20 km. It is understandable that it is possible to study such a large region and to investigate routes extending over several dozen or hundreds of kilometers only with the help of helicopters. But here is where new difficulties arise: How in this case can one specify the tasks of the units and subunits in the terrain, determine the regions of the artillery firing positions, the order for overcoming artificial obstacles, etc?

The situation is also complicated by the fact that the means available to the forces for reconnaissance, command and control, and support as well as the weapons and in general the organizational personnel structure of the combined units are not at all adapted to such conditions. Here it is appropriate to remember the experience in Afghanistan, in particular the experience in the decentralized use of forces and weapons. There were practically no cases in which a division operated at full strength. And it was infrequent that they made use of the regiment. As a rule, they established an improvised detachment for the accomplishment of some particular combat task or other such as the destruction of a recognized base of the enemy, for example—usually on the basis of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion. Its actions

were supported by artillery, combat helicopters, and aviation. The Americans operated in an analogous manner in Vietnam.

Thus, combat experience teaches: a unique "detachment" ("group") system of actions can become typical for armed conflicts. The combat strength of the established detachments may differ. The main thing here is to support their fire and tactical independence and capability of operating for a long time (two or three days) separately from the main forces of one's own troops and the rear base. It is expedient to form detachments under the principle of specific designation, for example it is necessary to have a reconnaissance and search detach to determine the combat strength and precise location of enemy groupings.

It is advisable to have a raiding and assault detachment to carry out raiding and assault actions for the purpose of identifying and destroying a particular grouping of the enemy. Its basis is mobile (armored and motorized rifle) subunits strengthened with artillery and engineering subunits. To seal off important facilities at the disposition of the enemy, it is necessary to have blocking detachments that essentially include motorized rifle subunits. The support of the actions of reconnaissance-search, raiding-assault, and blocking detachments will require strike detachments established primarily on the basis of artillery subunits and subunits of combat helicopters.

As experience shows, it is not advisable to assign a strictly limited zone of action to a detachment, especially a reconnaissance-search or raiding-assault detachment, for this will paralyze their maneuver. It is enough for them to determine the general direction of the actions and the objectives—immediate, intermediate, and final. If the enemy grouping is determined insufficiently fully (and this may be the case very often), then it is expedient to practice "alternative" planning, that is, to determine not one but two and sometimes even three possible versions of the action.

It is understandable that the method of "actions by detachments" can be quite effective only in the event of thorough organization and comprehensive support. Because it is by no means always possible to apply active-offensive forms of combat, the forces must be able to engage in delaying and stabilizing actions. That is, it will no longer be defense in its classic form. Delaying actions infer the establishment of mobile (air mobile) screens and migratory weapons positions and the setting up of ambushes and killing zones in the path of the enemy's advance.

In the event of the lack of the necessary number of weapons, the most acceptable thing here may be the selective-restrictive method of effecting the enemy, the essence of which is the selection of the most important facilities in his grouping and concentration on the suppression of most of the weapons operating in the given

sector. In covering open flanks for the purpose of counteracting the close and wide envelopments of the enemy, use can be made of the barrier-blocking method, which infers the establishment of fire barriers primarily on natural boundaries in combination with the remote mining of the terrain.

Since combat operations under these conditions are developed on a broad front but artillery has a limited range of fire, combat helicopters play a greater role in the fire support of the forces. Use may also be made of mixed groups of aircraft and helicopters put together from reconnaissance and combat (strike) helicopters and ground attack aircraft.

In short, again and again we have been convinced that there are no "easy" wars and that one must prepare the forces thoroughly for even what at first glance would seem to be an insignificant military conflict. Today the experience of local wars and military conflicts—and about 200 of them have been unleashed in the world from 1945 through 1992—is especially valid for us, because, as was recently stated at one of the UN sessions, "the bell of every regional conflict tolls for all of us."

SECURITY SERVICES

Internal Troops' Officer Education Programs

[Unattributed article under "Your Choice" rubric:
"From Alexander I to Our Time"]

[Text] It is difficult to imagine a state would not be concerned about its internal security.

The fundamental reforms that established the organizational bases of the entire internal service on the scale of the Russian state date back to the time of the reign of Alexander I, who on 16 January 1811 signed an edict on the establishment of a special kind of troops—the internal guard including local military commands, which previously were under the jurisdiction of the civil authorities and along with the police were responsible for the "preservation of peace and calm." "...the provincial companies and regular commands," stated a document from the "highest" level, "should be better organized and made to conform to their current service function and to the general order and we order that all these commands be transferred from civilian to military authority...."

The emperor's edict from 27 March to the military minister ordered the regular provincial companies and commands to be redeployed in the capitals of the provinces [guberniyas] and internal guard battalions to be formed from them. At the decision of the Military Collegium a month later, these battalions were brought together in 20 brigades. On 3 July 1811, the "Statute for the Internal Guard" was affirmed at the highest level.

In comparing the tasks of Russia's contemporary internal troops with those of their predecessors, one can find much in common. And there is perhaps nothing surprising about this: There have been changes in the political situations,

social foundations, and nature of crime and violations of the law but the essence of military service in defense of the interests of the state, society, and individual, the "preservation of peace and calm," has remained as it was.

A special page in the history of the internal troops was the participation in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945. Not many people know that on that memorable June morning the fascist forces first hit not only our border troops but also our troops at small garrisons guarding railroad bridges and other structures along the western border. In the first weeks of military action, the internal troops sent to the fighting army large and well-trained forces, forming 15 rifle divisions, which operated in the most dangerous sectors of the front. All of them fought courageously and some subsequently received honorary names.

The manner in which the internal troops fought is shown, among other things, by the fact that an individual special-purpose motorized rifle brigade that was formed in 1941 and became an educational center for the training of reconnaissance-subversion groups for actions in the enemy's rear trained 22 Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them were the commanders of partisan formations D. Medvedev (the legendary scout N. Kuznetsov operated in his detachment), V. Karasev, F. Ozmitel, and others.

Altogether more than 200 servicemen trained by the internal troops were honored with the lofty title of Hero during the period of the Great Patriotic War.

The soldiers and sergeants, warrant officers and officers of the internal troops perform an entire spectrum of the most varied missions: They perform guard and convoy duty, they support the public order in cities and towns, and they participate in the elimination of the consequences of earthquakes and other natural disasters as well as the freeing of hostages from the grip of terrorists.... For several years now, servicemen of the internal troops have been providing for public security at so-called "hot spots" in regions where states of emergency prevail.

The troops have all that they need to handle such complex and multifaceted missions. They include not only combined units and operational units but also special motorized, air, and naval units. The internal troops have a solid base for the training of junior commanders and various kinds of specialists.

Those wishing to tie their fate to the troops may do so by signing a contract for three or five years. Men 18 to 40 years of age are accepted for contract service on a voluntary basis. For some positions, women from 20 to 40 years of age are accepted.

Questions involving contract service in the troops are resolved in the military units of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and also by the military commissariats of the republics in the Russian Federation, autonomous okrug, kray, or oblast, and cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The officer corps is formed from graduates of higher military educational institutions of the internal troops. Here are their addresses:

Vladikavkaz Higher Military Command Red Banner School imeni S.M. Kirov—362005, g. Vladikavkaz, 5;

Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School—630114, g. Novosibirsk, 114;

Saratov Higher Military Red Banner Command School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy—410023, g. Saratov, 23;

St. Petersburg Higher Military Command School—198075, g. Sankt-Peterburg, 75;

Perm Higher Military Command-Rear School—614108, g. Perm, 108

The schools accept inducted personnel, reserve personnel with a military service obligation, service personnel in extended service at the end of two years of extended service, and warrant officers at the end of two years of service in positions of warrant officers or officers no older than 23 years of age; also civilian youths 17 to 21 years of age.

Service personnel wishing to enter a school present a request to the command prior to 1 April and those with a service obligation and civilian youths submit an application to rayon (city) military commissariats or internal affairs sections in their place of residence prior to 1 May.

The graduates of higher military educational institutions are assigned the rank of lieutenant and are given a diploma of the Russian type with conferment of the qualification of jurist (for higher military command schools) or engineer of a particular profile (for the Perm Higher Military Command-Rear School).

Both officers finishing higher troop schools and contract personnel among those accepted for service on a voluntary basis have good opportunities to improve their education.

You can be certain that when you enter into service in the troops you obtain guarantees of your social protection!

Persons performing service in the internal troops are assured monetary remuneration in the manner and in accordance with the standards set by the Government of the Russian Federation for service personnel.

Service personnel of the internal troops are granted certain privileges guaranteed by the laws of the Russian Federation on the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and on the status of service personnel:

—payment of monetary compensation instead of a food ration, the amount of which changes as prices rise, being equal to 1,445 rubles [R] a day beginning 1 February of this year;

- payment at the end of the year of a monetary award for the conscientious performance of duties in the amount of three salaries for the duty assignment and military rank;
- payment of an award for class qualification of up to 7 percent of the salary for the duty assignment;
- payment of a bonus for special service conditions up to 60 percent of the duty salary;
- provision of material assistance once a year in the amount of one salary for the duty assignment and military rank.

In set cases at the request of the service personnel, they are issued an interest-free loan in the amount of 12 salaries for the duty assignment and military rank over a period of up to three years for the initial provision of a household.

Those entering service in the troops are freed from the payment of income tax on monetary compensation, monetary awards, and other payments that they receive in connection with the performance of the obligations of their military service and also from the payment of the land tax and property tax.

Provision is made for the compulsory state individual insurance of the service personnel of the internal troops; for free transportation on all kinds of public transportation in the cities, suburbs, and localities (except taxis), and also—in utilizing basic leave to the site of their leisure activity and back, including by air; a free one-way trip once a year for family members of contract service personnel—to the place of leave and back.

To this one must also add the following possibilities:

- free medical assistance in military-medical subunits, units, and institutions and the possibility for service personnel and members of their families to rest and improve their health in the rest homes and sanatoria of the internal troops and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia;
- aid to the wives of servicemen who do not have the possibility of finding work at the place of service of their husbands;
- provision of places in children's preschool institutions for children of service personnel with payment under favorable conditions;
- provision of monetary compensation for cadets undergoing schooling at military educational institutions of the internal troops beginning with the second course at the norms for personnel serving under contract. And this is despite the fact that they are provided other kinds of allowances (food, personal property, medical services, and others) free of charge.

The Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of Service Personnel also provides for:

- payment of monetary compensation with the departure of the serviceman for leave in the amount of six minimum payments for labor as set by law (as of the time of departure for leave) for the serviceman himself and three minimum payments for labor as set by law for his wife and for each minor child.

It is also worth knowing that service personnel without permanent living quarters or in need of improving their living conditions are provided free financial aid for the acquisition of housing:

- not less than 75 percent of the cost of living quarters for those with a total service time of 10 to 25 years and 100 percent for those having served 25 years or longer;
- payment of living space, municipal services, and the installation and use of apartment telephones amounts to 50 percent of the cost.

If the service personnel of the internal troops serve in remote places or places with severe climatic conditions, they are paid more for the performance of their duties (up to 100 percent more) and also a bonus for uninterrupted service in these places (up to 100 percent of the salary for the duty position and military rank).

The service personnel of the internal troops are granted additional privileges for the performance of missions in defense of the constitutional rights of citizens under the conditions of a state of emergency and under the conditions of armed conflicts:

- payment of additional salaries and salaries twice the standard for the military rank;
- one month of military service in these regions counts as three;
- mission expenses are paid for the entire period of the performance of the tasks;
- additional leave amounting to 10 calendar days is granted for each 3 months of military service in these regions.

[Boxed material] So, you have been given some information to think about.

Your choice depends on you and you alone.

BUT IF YOU are dreaming of the romance of military service, are not afraid of difficulties, and do not consider yourself a weakling and if you want to participate directly in the building of a law-governed state, are prepared in the role of a soldier of peacemaking forces to act where your help is needed, and are not averse to fighting for the right to wear the red beret of the special forces, then you will have made the right decision!

The internal troops are waiting for you!

[Additional boxed material under the heading "In One Paragraph"]

The elite of the internal troops is a special-purpose formation. They are always prepared to tackle on short notice any military mission thousands of kilometers from the place of their deployment. By no means everyone has the right to wear the red beret of the special forces. It must be earned through outstanding performance in special training and through flawless execution of the soldier's duty.

856 officers and warrant officers of the internal troops took part in combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan as military advisers. 522 of them were given state awards.

In the last two years alone, operational and special motorized military units carried out more than 50,000 service and combat missions. 2,142 firearms and 236,000 pieces of ammunition of various kinds were confiscated by front-line details together with internal affairs agencies or independently; they confiscated 2,165 grenades and explosive devices and 24 pieces of armored equipment.

In eliminating the consequences of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, troop personnel saved 659 people and confiscated from plunderers and turned over to the state money and material assets valued at R9,157,150. Patrol details arrested 203 robbers and marauders and confiscated 44 firearms and a large quantity of ammunition. The fund to help the population suffering from the disaster collected R531,237 and 3,154 liters of blood were given.

More than 14,500 servicemen of the internal troops participated in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, whereby 276 of them were awarded orders and medals for self-sacrificing actions and 162 officers were given military ranks one level higher than is foreseen for the position that they hold.

Altogether more than 4,300 servicemen of the internal troops were given state awards in the period from 1989 through 1993.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

4 MAY 1994